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Imagine the following hypothetical, patterned on an actual case
pending in federal court,1 and you can begin to appreciate why there is a
growing awareness of the need to have clear analytical thinking
regarding the admissibility of electronically stored information,
variously referred to as “ESI,” “digital,” “electronic,” “computer
generated,” or “computer stored” evidence in state and federal courts.
ConsumerPro is a corporation that provides installment credit to
consumers with poor or un-established credit records to enable them to
purchase on credit expensive electronic and computer products like flat
screen televisions, computers, and entertainment systems. Under their
business plan, a purchaser agrees to buy a product in installments, such
as automatic withdrawals from a bank account, and only after the
purchaser has made a series of payments is the product shipped to the
purchaser, who then continues to make payments until the purchase
price is fully paid.
ConsumerPro has a website that advertises its products, has contact
information for inquiries about billing, and provides customer service.
ConsumerPro makes most of its sales by running advertisements on
national television by targeting its ads during popular TV programs. The
ads pitch the products, then list a telephone number to call for more
information and to make a purchase, and encourage the viewer to call
immediately to get the benefit of a time limited special deal. When the
purchaser calls the number, she speaks with a telemarketing employee of
Tele-Sales, Inc., a separate company that ConsumerPro contracts with to
handle the sales calls. Because ConsumerPro provides installment
credit, it must comply with a host of federal and state consumer
protection laws that require certain mandatory disclosures that must be
given, or the purchase is voidable, and ConsumerPro could also face
civil and criminal penalties. In order to comply with all the regulatory

1. The names of the parties used in the hypothetical are fictitious, as are some of the facts.
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requirements, ConsumerPro’s general counsel has carefully drafted the
script that must be read with complete accuracy by the telemarketers
working at Tele-Sales call centers. To insure regulatory compliance, the
contract between ConsumerPro and Tele-Sales requires use of the script
provided by ConsumerPro, without deviation, and creates a penalty to
Tele-Sales for each call that fails to adhere to the script. Because the
Tele-Sales telemarketers receive very sensitive financial information
from the purchasers who call in, they operate under strict security
conditions. No writing materials are permitted in the call center. The
telemarketers have a phone headset they wear, and log into a secure
ConsumerPro website, where the current version of the script is accessed
and read to the purchaser, and when the telemarketer receives the
purchaser’s financial information, it is entered by computer keyboard
directly into the ConsumerPro website, which electronically records all
the details of the purchase. In addition, all the sales calls are recorded so
that ConsumerPro can monitor them to ensure compliance with the
disclosure script. Thus, there are no “paper” copies of the script, or the
individual installment sales contracts; all this information is
electronically displayed and maintained by ConsumerPro. If a dispute
arises regarding a particular sale, ConsumerPro can print off the screen
for the contract, and then listen to the recording of the sales call to
determine if there was regulatory compliance and a valid sale.
After six months of handling sales calls for ConsumerPro, TeleSales’s contract is abruptly cancelled by ConsumerPro, allegedly
because of systemic failures to comply with the obligation to adhere to
the marketing script. ConsumerPro contends that so many calls were
noncompliant that most of the contracts are voidable, and refuses to pay
Tele-Sales. Tele-Sales contends that their telemarketers faithfully read
the script, and that ConsumerPro changed the script frequently,
significantly altering its content, and that ConsumerPro is attempting to
avoid paying for calls that followed the script that appeared on the
ConsumerPro marketing site, by referencing a subsequently changed
version of the script. ConsumerPro denies this, and contends that they
matched the applicable script to the call, and determined that calls were
noncompliant. Because Tele-Sales does not have access to any “hard
copies” of the various scripts they followed, they must rely on what their
telemarketers recall as the content of the scripts. Tele-Sales sues
ConsumerPro in federal court for breach of contract, and ConsumerPro
files a counterclaim for breach of contract.
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In addition to its difficulties with Tele-Sales, ConsumerPro has
other problems. Thousands of customer complaints have been filed with
the Federal Trade Commission and various state Attorneys General
alleging unfair sales practices, misleading, inaccurate and false
representations posted on the ConsumerPro website, bait-and-switch
tactics, failure to adhere to the credit sales terms, failure to refund money
for cancelled sales, and customer service complaints regarding inferior
or deficient products. The FTC conducts an investigation, initiates
enforcement proceedings, concludes violations of federal law occurred,
and negotiates a consent decree with ConsumerPro. The FTC posts on
its website the investigation report and consent decree, and posts a
warning on its website for consumers, warning them about
ConsumerPro. Various state Attorneys General conduct their own
investigations, commence enforcement proceedings, post the results of
their investigations, and also post consumer warnings on their websites.
Eventually, a class action consumer fraud lawsuit is filed against
ConsumerPro.
Myriad evidentiary issues are raised by this hypothetical. First,
with the exception of the contract between Tele-Sales and ConsumerPro,
all of the “documentary evidence” that will determine the outcome of the
contract suit is computer generated and stored ESI. Second, the class
action against ConsumerPro will depend largely on consumer testimony
about what they saw on ConsumerPro’s website, which has been
changed many times, as well as the results of the FTC and Attorneys
General investigations that found unfair trade practices and consumer
fraud. The evidentiary issues associated with introducing electronic
evidence are complicated, and until recently, have not been addressed in
any comprehensive way.
In a recent opinion, however, Lorraine v. Markel American
Insurance Co.,2 the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland undertook the first comprehensive analysis of the evidentiary
rules and case law that govern the admissibility of electronic evidence at
trial, and for use at summary judgment.3 It remains the most
comprehensive single opinion regarding the admissibility of ESI, and

2. 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007).
3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(1) (providing that “[a] supporting or opposing affidavit must be
made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the
affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated”).
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has frequently been cited by other courts and in secondary sources.4
This Article will analyze the Lorraine opinion and its impact, as well as
provide some insight regarding additional authority relating to this new
frontier of evidence law.
I. DO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE APPLY TO ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE?
It is not a frivolous question to ask, “Do the existing rules of
evidence adequately deal with admissibility of electronic evidence?” In
a thoughtful, recently published book, attorney George Paul, who has
extensive experience dealing with evidentiary issues associated with
ESI/digital evidence,5 made the following observations:
The current evidentiary scheme comprises three main historical
policies: (1) the notion of authentic writings, exemplified by the search
for an “original” object tying certain people, acting at a certain time, to
certain permanently recorded information; (2) the rule against hearsay,
giving litigants the right to test factual statements through crossexamination, unless there was an accepted policy reason not to do so;
4. See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of America v. McPherson, No. C 06-4670 SBA, 2008 WL
4183981, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 551); Phillips v. Morbark,
Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 591, 596 (D.S.C. 2007) (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 534-553); Scotts Co.
LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2:06-CV-899, 2007 WL 1723509, at *3 n.2 (S.D. Ohio June 12,
2007) (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 547); Estate of Gonzales v. Hickman, No. ED CV 05-660
MMM (RCx), 2007 WL 3237727, at *2 n.3 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2007) (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D.
at 534); Adams v. Disbennett, No. 9-08-14, 2008 WL 4615623, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 20,
2008) (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 543); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT RETENTION AND PRODUCTION, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY
ON ESI EVIDENCE & ADMISSIBILITY 1 (2008) [hereinafter SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY]
(recognizing Lorraine as the “recent, leading case on the subject” of using ESI as evidence “at trial
or in motion practice”); Gordon J. Calhoun & Susan F. Friedman, The Stage is Set, N.Y. L.J., Feb.
21, 2008, at 24 (“[Lorraine] provides an exegesis about what counsel must do when proffering ESI
during dispositive motions or trials . . . . As ESI may likely constitute the majority of information
offered as evidence in the future, counsel should utilize [Lorraine] as a road map to save time and
money by getting the evidentiary foundation issues right on the first audition.”); Adam I. Cohen,
The Revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Where We Are One Year Later, CORPORATE
COUNSELOR, Feb. 2008, at 4 (“In an opinion that is required reading for lawyers aspiring to use ESI
to win a case, Judge Grimm delivered a sweeping review of prior case law and analysis of the
Federal Rules of Evidence with respect to admissibility issues associated [with] all manner of
electronic evidence.”); Sheldon M. Finkelstein & Evelyn R. Storch, Admissibility of Electronically
Stored Information: It’s Still the Same Old Story, LITIGATION, Spring 2008, at 13, 17 (“A helpful
starting place for any analysis of admissibility of ESI is Chief United States Magistrate Judge Paul
W. Grimm’s decision in [Lorraine]. The lengthy ‘soup to nuts’ opinion is an authority-rich
discourse of every facet of the admission of evidence generally and of ESI in particular.”); Dale
Conder, Jr., The Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, FOR THE DEFENSE, Sept. 2008,
at 23, 29 (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 554, 574).
5. See GEORGE L. PAUL, FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE xxi (2007).
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and (3) the notion that evidence, particularly evidence implicating
specialized knowledge, be generally scientific in that it be subject to a
“test” of its hypotheses or methodologies. These policies are all
stressed by digital evidence . . . . There is now a new world of [digital]
evidence. New foundations are necessary.6

While this may be true, and a “new world order” of admitting and
weighing electronic evidence an inevitable outcome, this will not occur
overnight, and in the interim there must be a method of dealing with the
ever changing forms of digital or electronic evidence in court
proceedings. This means that the existing law of evidence must be
applied to the admissibility of electronic evidence, and courts that have
been asked to do so have expressed no significant concerns about the
adequacy of those rules to accomplish this task. As one court noted,
“Essentially, appellant would have us create a whole new body of law
just to deal with e-mails or instant messages. . . . We believe that e-mail
messages and similar forms of electronic communications can be
properly authenticated within the existing framework of [the rules of
evidence].”7 Recognizing this, the Lorraine opinion identifies the
following five evidentiary “hurdles” that must be evaluated in order to
assess the admissibility of electronically stored or digital evidence:
Whether ESI is admissible into evidence is determined by a collection
of evidence rules that present themselves like a series of hurdles to be
cleared by the proponent of the evidence. Failure to clear any of these
evidentiary hurdles means that the evidence will not be admissible.
Whenever ESI is offered as evidence, either at trial or in summary
judgment, the following evidence rules must be considered: (1) is the
ESI relevant as determined by Rule 401 (does it have any tendency to
make some fact that is of consequence to the litigation more or less
probable than it otherwise would be); (2) if relevant under 401, is it
authentic as required by Rule 901(a) (can the proponent show that the
ESI is what it purports to be); (3) if the ESI is offered for its
substantive truth, is it hearsay as defined by Rule 801, and if so, is it

6. Id. at 13-14.
7. In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). See also DAVID F. HERR, MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.446 (4th Ed. 2007) (stating that “the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to
computerized data as they do to other types of evidence”); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 538 n.5 (“FED.
R. EVID. 102 contemplates that the rules of evidence are flexible enough to accommodate future
‘growth and development’ to address technical changes not in existence as of the codification of the
rules themselves. Further, courts have had little difficulty using the existing rules of evidence to
determine the admissibility of ESI, despite the technical challenges that sometimes must be
overcome to do so.”).
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covered by an applicable exception (Rules 803, 804 and 807); (4) is the
form of the ESI that is being offered as evidence an original or
duplicate under the original writing rule, or if not, is there admissible
secondary evidence to prove the content of the ESI (Rules 1001-1008);
and (5) is the probative value of the ESI substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice or one of the other factors identified by
Rule 403, such that it should be excluded despite its relevance.8

However, before discussing each of these evidentiary hurdles, the
Lorraine opinion noted the importance of Federal Rules of Evidence
104(a) and 104(b), which deal with preliminary rulings on admissibility
of evidence, existence of a privilege, and qualifications of witnesses, and
the related concept of conditional relevance.9
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS AND CONDITIONAL RELEVANCE.
As noted in Lorraine, “the relationship between Rule 104(a) and (b)
can complicate the process by which ESI is admitted into evidence at
trial, or may be considered at summary judgment.”10 Rule 104(a) states:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of
subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the
rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.11

This rule is important for several reasons. First, it establishes the
role of the trial judge as the one who must determine whether evidence
is admissible, which includes the familiar foundational rulings such as
whether evidence is relevant, and if so, if it is excessively prejudicial;
whether an expert witness is qualified to testify, and if so whether her
opinions have a sufficient factual basis and are based on reliable
methodology; whether out of court statements, whether written or oral,
are hearsay, and if so, whether they fall within the scope of a hearsay
exception; whether an evidentiary privilege applies; and when the
contents of a writing, recording or photograph are being proved, whether
the proof constitutes an original, duplicate, or acceptable secondary

8.
9.
10.
11.
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evidence of its contents under the original writing rule.12 These
preliminary evidentiary rulings can be purely “legal,” such as whether
proffered evidence is relevant (does it have “any tendency” to make a
fact that is “of consequence” to the litigation more probable or less
probable than it would be without the proffered evidence), but may also
involve mixed questions of law and fact, such as whether a document
qualifies as a business record (was it a record of a “business,” made at or
near the time of the events referenced in the record, by someone with
personal knowledge of those facts, was the activity that the record refers
to a “regular” one, is it the regular practice of the business to “make and
maintain” the record for use in its business, and whether the document is
otherwise trustworthy, all of which require the judge to engage in fact
finding).
Rule 104(a) is qualified by Rule 104(b), which states: “When the
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of
fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition.”13 This is the so-called “conditional relevance” rule, and it
reserves for the jury the determination of disputed facts that must be
established in order for certain proffered evidence to be relevant. Thus,
for example, if the plaintiff contends that her supervisor created a hostile
workplace by sending her inappropriate e-mails, and the supervisor
denies that he authored the e-mails, claiming instead that someone else
“spoofed” them on his computer, the harassing e-mails will not be
“relevant” (tend to prove intentional gender based discrimination) unless
the jury first determines that the supervisor is the author.
The Lorraine opinion notes the importance of Rule 104(b) with
regard to one very important component of determining the admissibility
of ESI, whether it is authentic, noting “‘because authentication is
essentially a question of conditional relevancy, the jury ultimately
resolves whether evidence admitted for its consideration is that which
the proponent claims.’”14 Lorraine also points out a little appreciated
12. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 31-37 (3rd Ed.
2003).
13. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
14. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 539-40 (quoting United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370
(4th Cir. 1992)); see also FED. R. EVID. 901(a) advisory committee’s notes to the 1972 proposed
rules (“Authentication and identification represent a special aspect of relevancy . . . . This
requirement of showing authenticity or identity falls in the category of relevancy dependent upon
fulfillment of a condition of fact and is governed by the procedure set forth in Rule 104(b).”)
(citations omitted).
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aspect of the relationship between Rule 104(a) and 104(b). When a
judge makes a preliminary determination under Rule 104(a) that
evidence is admissible, or a privilege applies, or that a witness is
qualified, he is not required to apply the rules of evidence except the
rules of privilege when considering the facts proffered in support of and
against the ruling.15 In contrast, however, when the jury is finding facts
under the conditional relevance rule to determine whether proffered
evidence is relevant, such as when they determine whether evidence of a
posting on a website is authentic, the facts that they consider must be
admissible in evidence.16 Lorraine summarizes this distinction as
follows:
In short, there is a significant difference between the way that Rule
104(a) and 104(b) operate. Because, under Rule 104(b), the jury, not
the court, makes the factual findings that determine admissibility, the
facts introduced must be admissible under the rules of evidence. It is
important to understand this relationship when seeking to admit ESI.
For example, if an e-mail is offered into evidence, the determination of
whether it is authentic would be for the jury to decide under Rule
104(b), and the facts that they consider in making this determination
must be admissible into evidence. In contrast, if the ruling on whether
the e-mail is an admission by a party opponent or a business record
turns on contested facts, the admissibility of those facts will be
determined by the judge under 104(a), and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, except for privilege, are inapplicable.17

Few counsel fully appreciate the importance of this distinction,
which is especially important when dealing with admissibility of ESI,
because the most challenging aspect of admitting digital evidence is to
establish its authenticity.18 Lorraine devotes its most extensive
discussion to this issue. The essential point to take away from this
15. See FED. R. EVID. RULE 104(a) (“In making its determination [the court] is not bound by
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.”) (emphasis added). See also FED. R.
EVID. 1101(d)(1) (“The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not apply in the following
situations: . . . The determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when
the issue is to be determined by the court under rule 104.”).
16. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 540.
17. Id.
18. PAUL, supra note 5, at 17 (“Thus two monumental changes are brought on by digital
technology, affecting the two most important concepts in the law of evidence. The first is related to
the new type of writing that has evolved, viewed in its discrete manifestations. The ‘object’ the law
examines has changed radically. It is no longer physical matter. It is information itself. Indeed,
writing’s departure from the world of physical artifacts revolutionizes the concept of authenticity.
The written record must now be analyzed differently than before.”).
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discussion in Lorraine is that the proponent of digital evidence must
carefully consider how she will authenticate it if its admissibility is
challenged, and note that the evidence proffered to establish its
authentication must itself be admissible into evidence.
III. AUTHENTICATION OF ESI
In actuality, the authentication of evidence is a relatively
straightforward concept: “A piece of paper or electronically stored
information, without any indication of its creator, source, or custodian
may not be authenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence 901.”19
Nevertheless, in the two years since Lorraine was issued, courts and
counsel still seem to struggle with the basic principles of authentication
as it applies to electronic evidence. Some courts are still permitting only
rudimentary admissibility standards and counsel are still, at times,
failing to meet that low bar. As electronic evidence becomes more
ubiquitous at trial, it is critical for courts to start demanding that counsel
give more in terms of authentication—and counsel who fail to meet
courts’ expectations will do so at their own peril.
It may come as no surprise to the readers of this Article that
Lorraine was drafted, in part, as a “how to” for the authentication of
electronic evidence. It was written to assist counsel in better preparing
themselves for the use of electronic evidence during trial by clarifying
how Rules 901 and 902 might apply. As Lorraine demonstrates,
electronic evidence comes in many forms and it is no secret that
someone highly adept with computers has the ability to make viewers
see whatever he or she wants them to see. But it is also a very real
possibility that someone inept with computers may also alter electronic
evidence so as to make it unusable or inadmissible.20 Therefore, as
technology continues creating relevant evidence while, simultaneously,
outpacing the working knowledge and ability of most lawyers and
judges to deal with it, ensuring proper authentication of electronic
evidence becomes a greater responsibility for attorneys and judges alike.

19. United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2008).
20. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL pt.4, at
20 (9th ed. vol. 5 2006) (“The wrinkle for authenticity purposes is that, because Internet data is
electronic, it can be manipulated and offered into evidence in a distorted form.”).
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A. Rule 901
Rule 901 requires that evidence be authenticated before being
admitted.21 That requirement sets a relatively low bar, permitting
evidence to be authenticated if the “matter in question is what its
proponent claims.”22 But, as Lorraine points out, the rule is silent as to
how, exactly, courts and lawyers should demonstrate that evidence is
“what its proponent claims.”23
As a launching point, Lorraine relied on a number of Rule 901(b)
illustrations24 to describe the best manner by which to authenticate
particular forms of electronic evidence. The particular illustration to be
applied depends generally on the type of electronic evidence to be
admitted, the manner in which it was created, and its intended use at
trial. The most likely illustrations to apply to the majority of electronic
evidence under Rule 901 include:
•

•

•

E-mail Evidence:
o Rule 901(b)(1), “Testimony of a Witness with
Knowledge”
o Rule 901(b)(3), “Comparison by Trier or Expert
Witness”
o Rule 901(b)(4), “Distinctive Characteristics and the
Like”
Internet Websites
o Rule 901(b)(1), “Testimony of a Witness with
Knowledge”
o Rule 901(b)(3), “Comparison by Trier or Expert
Witness”
o Rule 901(b)(4), “Distinctive Characteristics and the
Like”
o Rule 901(b)(7), “Public Records or Reports”
o Rule 901(b)(9), “Process or System”
Chat Room and Test Messages

21. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
22. Id.
23. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 542 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 901(a)).
24. Structurally, Rule 901 has two parts. Rule 901(a) contains the substantive requirement
that evidence be authenticated or identified before it may be admitted. Rule 901(b) provides the
non-exclusive illustrations of how this may be done. The proponent of the evidence can, therefore,
“pick and choose” among these illustrations, but is also free to develop others. FED. R. EVID. 901.
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Rule 901(b)(1), “Testimony of a Witness with
Knowledge”
o Rule 901(b)(4), “Distinctive Characteristics and the
Like”
Computerized Records or Data
o Rule 901(b)(1), “Testimony of a Witness with
Knowledge”
o Rule 901(b)(3), “Comparison by Trier or Expert
Witness”
o Rule 901(b)(4), “Distinctive Characteristics and the
Like”
o Rule 901(b)(9), “Process or System”
Computer Animations
o Rule 901(b)(1), “Testimony of a Witness with
Knowledge”
o Rule 901(b)(3), “Comparison by Trier or Expert
Witness”
Computer Simulations
o Rule 901(b)(1), “Testimony of a Witness with
Knowledge”
o Rule 901(b)(3), “Comparison by Trier or Expert
Witness”
Digital Photographs
o Rule 901(b)(9), “Process or System”25
o

•

•

•

•

With this “checklist” in mind, it is helpful to see what courts have
done with various types of ESI when determining whether it is authentic.
1. Internet Websites
Introduction of the content of websites, and website search results,
is becoming an increasingly common evidentiary occurrence. Searches
and Internet surfing are easy and common practices, but using those
results at trial requires counsel to step away from the computer, and
think about how, exactly, the proffered website should be authenticated.
In Whelan v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.,26 decided
after Lorraine, the plaintiff sought to introduce Nexis printouts as

25. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 541-49 (discussing Rule 901 and its subparts); id. at 554-63
(applying Rule 901 to the types of evidence listed above).
26. No. CV06-4948PSG (PLAX), 2007 WL 1891175, at *11 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2007).
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evidence to show that the doctor who performed the plaintiff’s
examination was biased and closely affiliated with an insurance
company.27 The plaintiff argued that the printouts would demonstrate
that the doctor was associated with a network of providers that
“cater[ed] exclusively to the insurance industry.”28 To authenticate the
printouts, plaintiff’s counsel submitted a declaration “stating that the
printouts are true and correct copies of the result of an internet search of
services provided to insurance companies by [the network of
providers].”29 The defendant objected to the evidence, in part, on the
grounds that the evidence had not been authenticated.30
The court examined the evidence and held that, although the
printouts had a URL address and date stamp, the attorney’s declaration
was insufficient to authenticate them.31 What was required, the court
held, was a “declaration by the person who personally conducted the
search, or by the company stating that the computer printouts are a true
and correct copy of the information from its website.”32 The standard
insisted upon by the court in Whelan reflects the manner in which courts
may avoid the concerns identified in Lorraine that a website may
include information not officially sanctioned by its alleged owner.
Accordingly, when faced with the authentication of websites, as
reflected in Whelan, courts may require “proof by the proponent that the
organization hosting the website actually posted the statements or
authorized their postings.”33
A similar case, also decided after Lorraine, related to the
authentication of websites and e-mails serves not only to underscore the
importance of authentication, but as a warning that authentication should
be done properly. In Bowers v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia,34 the authentication of e-mails and websites became an issue in
the plaintiff’s claims associated with her termination from the
University.35 As part of her cross-motion for summary judgment, the
27. Id. at *11.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 555 (D. Md. 2007) (citing United States
v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000); St. Luke’s Cataract & Laser Inst. P.A. v. Sanderson,
No. 8:06-CV-223-T-MSS, 2006 WL 1320242 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2006); Wady v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
34. No. 3:06cv00041, 2007 WL 2963818, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 9, 2007).
35. Id. at *1.
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plaintiff, by counsel, submitted a thirty-eight page memorandum and
seventy-four exhibits totaling over 600 pages.36 Included with those 600
pages were an incendiary affidavit, fifty-one unauthenticated e-mails,
and unauthenticated printouts from a Virginia Employment Commission
website and a University of Virginia webpage.37 The defendants
responded by contending that most of plaintiff’s evidence was
inadmissible and moved to strike the plaintiff’s unauthenticated
submissions while also seeking sanctions under Rule 56(g).38
As part of her reply, plaintiff’s counsel attempted to remedy her
failure to authenticate the e-mails and websites by way of a personal
affidavit wherein “she stated that the contested exhibits were in fact
‘authentic’ because the e-mails had been obtained from the defendants
during the course of discovery and the web pages were taken from
‘published’ internet websites.”39 Her attempt to authenticate was viewed
by the court as “an abject failure on her part either to understand or to
appreciate a number of evidence rules, including inter alia Evidence
Rules 402, 404, 802, 805, and 901.”40 Accordingly, the court granted
the defendants’ motion for Rule 56(g) sanctions, in part because:
[T]he submission by plaintiff’s counsel of . . . more than fifty
unauthenticated copies of e-mails convincingly demonstrates both a
recklessness and an absence of preparation on the part of plaintiff’s
counsel. Equally so, her resort to use of her own affidavit in a
misguided quick-and-easy attempt to fix significant evidentiary
deficiencies, demonstrates a recklessness in preparation and a failure to
exercise legal judgment abject.41

2. Chat Rooms and Text Messages
Anyone with teenage children or who has been to the mall
recognizes that chat rooms and instant and text messaging are playing a
larger part in the way we communicate as a society. Like it or hate it, it
is a form of communication that is becoming increasingly pervasive, and
therefore will be offered as evidence in civil and criminal cases. Chat
room and text or instant messaging “dialogues,” for example, pose

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
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unique challenges to authentication due in large part to the fact that they
typically are created by parties using anonymity-protecting “screen
names” on websites where the host cannot be assumed to know the
content. Courts have recognized numerous ways to authenticate the use
of chat room transcripts, including authentication circumstantially under
Rule 901(b)(4) and testimony by a witness with personal knowledge.42
In Adams v. Disbennett,43 the court held that a witness with
personal knowledge was sufficient to authenticate instant message texts.
In a case arising between disgruntled online lovers, the municipal court
permitted the plaintiff to introduce transcripts of instant messaging that
took place between the couple.44 On appeal, defendant claimed that the
court erred by admitting transcripts that plaintiff claimed were not
properly authenticated under Ohio’s equivalent of Rule 901.45 At trial,
the court permitted the plaintiff to authenticate the documents through
his own testimony based on personal knowledge.46 As part of that
testimony, the plaintiff identified his and defendant’s screen names,
stated that he had not changed any of the private messages, and testified
that the exhibits were a printout of what he saw on the screen on the
various days the two chatted.47
The defendant rebutted this evidence by stating that “she could not
recall typing the messages [the plaintiff] attributed to her.”48 Relying in
part on Lorraine, defendant challenged the authentication of the
documents and urged the Court of Appeals of Ohio to find error in the
lower court’s ruling through the use of a more exacting standard for the
authentication of the transcripts.49 The court denied the defendant’s
plea, finding no error since “there need be only a prima facie showing, to
the court, of authenticity” and that the jury would be the final assessor of
the full authenticity of the transcripts.50 Accordingly, the court of
appeals found that the “trial court was in the best position to observe the
witnesses and assess credibility” and that it did not abuse its discretion
when it authenticated the plaintiff’s exhibits.51

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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3. Computerized Records or Data
As Lorraine warned, “although computer records are the easiest to
authenticate, there is growing recognition that more care is required to
authenticate these electronic records than traditional ‘hard copy’
records.”52 Cases decided after Lorraine illustrate this trend.
A case in point is United States v. Baker,53 where prosecutors failed
to authenticate key evidence related to the prosecution of a man charged
with distributing child pornography. That key piece of evidence was a
report put together by the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children (“NCMEC”) that summarized the tip it had received from
Yahoo, Inc. regarding Baker’s uploading of child pornography to a
website, along with the filenames of the forty-six images he uploaded.54
Relying solely on Rules 803(6) and 803(8), the government argued that
the report was admissible hearsay as a business or public record.55 But
“[t]he Government’s position misse[d] the mark” in that it completely
failed to authenticate the evidence.56
During the course of the trial, the government failed to offer
evidence to authenticate the NCMEC report.57 The only witness called
to identify the report and the forty-six images it named was the
investigating police officer from the Texas Attorney General’s Cyber
Crimes Unit.58 This officer, however, did not testify that he had any
personal knowledge of how the NCMEC report was prepared; nor did
the officer have any knowledge of how the NCMEC responds to tips it
receives from internet service providers.59
Additionally, the
Government did not contend that the report was self-authenticating
under Rule 902 or under any authentication methods listed in Rule
901(b).60 In fact, the court pointed out, “[t]he record [was] devoid of
any evidence authenticating [the exhibit].”61 Accordingly, as the

52. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 557.
53. 538 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2008).
54. Id. at 331.
55. Id.
56. Id. This ruling emphasizes the critically important point that began the analysis in
Lorraine, namely that there are a series of evidentiary rules that must be considered when planning
to introduce ESI, and failure to do so risks exclusion of the evidence. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 53839.
57. Baker, 538 F.3d at 331.
58. Id. at 326.
59. Id. at 332.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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unauthenticated exhibit was the only evidence introduced to demonstrate
that the suspect uploaded child pornography, the court reversed and
vacated those charges.62
As demonstrated above, failing the simple first step of
authentication proved fatal to the prosecution’s case. The Baker court
recognized that the showing required to authenticate digital evidence
need not be great, and simply calling the NCMEC’s record custodian
under Rule 901(b)(7) would have been sufficient for authentication.63 It
would appear that the Fifth Circuit was not, in this case, concerned about
the accuracy of the report, only that it was in fact what the Government
purported it to be.64
In another case dealing with computer files associated with child
pornography, United States v. Salcido,65 a court once again examined
whether the Government’s evidence was properly authenticated. On the
appeal of his conviction, Salcido claimed that the Government failed to
authenticate the pornographic video and image files that were the basis
of the charges against him.66 At trial, the Government introduced the
video and image evidence “by presenting detailed evidence as to the
chain of custody, specifically how the images were retrieved from the
defendant’s computers.”67 The Ninth Circuit found that this was
sufficient to authenticate the video and image evidence under Rule
901.68
The Baker and Salcido cases are noteworthy because they
underscore that, while the authentication of digital evidence may not be
necessarily rigorous, it must occur. Both cases illustrate the observation
made in Lorraine that “to date, more courts have tended towards the
lenient rather than the demanding approach” of authentication.69
For example, a similar, and surprisingly low bar for authentication
was used by the U.S. District Court of Arizona in Linderoth Associates
v. Amberwood Development, Inc.70 In support of its motion for
summary judgment in a copyright case, a defendant proffered computer

62. Id. at 332-33.
63. Id. at 331 n.12.
64. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 557-59 (D. Md. 2007) (comparing
standards for the admissibility of business records).
65. 506 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1918 (2008).
66. Id. at 732-33.
67. Id. at 733.
68. Id.
69. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 558.
70. No. CV 06-00426-PHX-NVWAR, 2007 WL 2696851, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 12, 2007).
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printouts purporting to identify the dates it started and finished an
architectural plan that was at issue in the case.71 The plaintiff claimed
that the printout was not properly authenticated and the court permitted
the defendant to supply additional evidence to do so.72 In response, the
defendant filed an affidavit with the court from the company’s vicepresident wherein he “swore that he ‘assist[s] with the management of
the electronic storage of [defendant’s] files, including AutoCad files for
floor plans and drawings,’ that he understood that ‘[defendant’s]
database recorded the start and modification dates’ for the [at-issue] file,
and that he had personally reviewed the file and verified that its creation
date was [as stated in the printout].”73 Over the plaintiff’s objections,
the court held that the defendant’s proffer was sufficient to authenticate
the printouts.74 The court concluded that it would not be necessary for
the individual authenticating the record to possess “technical knowledge
of how the computer functions, nor is it necessary that the authenticator
be the one who created the file. It [would be] sufficient if the person
authenticating the record ha[d] personal knowledge of the record system
and [was] the custodian of the record in question.”75
The authentication rule applied in Linderoth seemed to be an
amalgamation of Rules 901(b)(1) and 901(b)(7), requiring the custodian
of the record to have personal knowledge of the record system, but not
the record itself. Although Rules 901(b)(1) and 901(b)(7) may be
sufficient for the authentication of some computer records, counsel
should be cautious when relying on their minimal standards. In relation
to the type of computer record offered in Linderoth, the standard used by
the court was minimal. Were the printouts that were proffered a report
automatically generated by AutoCad? If so, was the process that created
them reliable and accurate? How did the court know that the dates
reported on AutoCad and echoed in the report were, in fact, the proper
dates? The answers to these questions are unclear. As a result, the
opinion offers little guidance to attorneys who may be trying to
authenticate similar files or reports in the future. Accordingly, a more
proper authentication for such evidence may be Rule 901(b)(9).76 Rule

71. Id. at *2.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) (“Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a
result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.”).
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901(b)(9) “[was] designed for situations in which the accuracy of a
result is dependent upon a process or system which produces it.”77
Under the Rule 901(b)(9) standard “it is common for the proponent to
provide evidence of the input procedures and their accuracy, and
evidence that the computer was regularly tested for programming error,”
and “[a]t a minimum, the proponent should present evidence sufficient
to warrant a finding that the information is trustworthy and provide the
opponent with an opportunity to inquire into the accuracy of the
computer and of the input procedures.”78
4. Computer Records as Digital Images of Paper Records
Another variety of digital evidence that has been the subject of
scrutiny is digital images of paper records. A November 2008 White
Paper prepared by Cohasset Associates, Inc., emphasizes that many
companies who currently possess paper records are in the process of
converting or transforming them into computer records through
scanning.79 The White Paper provides an exacting review on the subject
of digital images and, in part, on how such images should be
authenticated for use at trial. Citing to Lorraine and In re Vee Vinhnee,80
the paper suggests that, when seeking to authenticate digital copies of
paper records, the proponent should add three steps to Professor
Imwinkleried’s eleven-steps for foundation suggested for computer
records.81 These steps include:

77. FED R. EVID. 901(b)(9) advisory committee’s notes to the 1972 proposed rules.
78. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
901.12[3], at 901-101 (2d ed. Supp. 2002) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Novak v. Tucows, Inc., No.
06-CV-1909, 2007 WL 922306, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007) (holding evidence created for trial
was sufficiently authenticated under Rule 901(b)(9) in that it sufficiently described “a process or
system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate
result”) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
79. See COHASSET ASSOCIATES, INC., THE LEGALITY OF DIGITAL IMAGE COPIES OF PAPER
RECORDS (October 2008), available at http://www.cohasset.com (click on “White Papers” tab, then
click on “The Legality of Digital Image Copies of Paper Records”) [hereinafter THE WHITE PAPER].
Cohasset Associates, Inc., is a nationwide consulting firm specializing in document-based
information management, and has edited and published numerous studies on the use of alternative
media for data storage.
80. Id. at 15 (citing Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 537 (D. Md. 2007); In
re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 448 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005)).
81. Id. at 15-16. As noted by the In re Vee Vinhnee court, Professor Imwinkelried recognized
“electronic records as a form of scientific evidence,” and suggested an eleven-step protocol for
authentication of such evidence. 336 B.R. at 446.
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The business has established policies and
procedures – guiding the execution of specific
activities and serving to enhance the quality with
which those activities are performed. (This is
significantly broader in scope than the #3
Imwinkelried requirement, which is focused on
“inserting data into the computer.”)
The business demonstrates it has created and
retained “management evidence” detailing (for
future quality verification) who did what, where and
when in the execution of the specific activities in the
regular course of business – showing that degree to
which the policies and procedures were followed.
The business manifests that its “management
evidence” was regularly audited for quality – and,
as part of an ongoing continuous improvement
process, deficiencies were addressed and
improvements were made to achieve high quality82

In proposing the additional steps, the White Paper suggests that
challenges to a records management process could be foreclosed by
establishing that the process by which documents were managed and/or
converted was sound. This is especially critical in terms of digitally
converted records where the original, paper records are destroyed and no
longer accessible after the information they contained is moved.83 If, at
trial, the process used by the proponent of digitized records is found
faulty, “the consequence of a ruling that some or all of that small
percentage [of litigation relevant documents] is inadmissible could prove
very costly.”84
5. Authentication by Experts
Under Rule 901(b)(3), the authentication of some forms of
electronic evidence may, at times, require the use of an expert to explain
either the technology used to create the evidence or the evidence

82. THE WHITE PAPER, supra note 79, at 15-16.
83. Id. at 17.
84. Id. at 19 (comment by Judge Ronald J. Hedges as to the use of the additional
requirements).
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resulting from the use of technology.85 It should be noted, however, that
authentication by an expert need not be overly burdensome. Courts
recognize that experts who rely on computers for their exhibits,
opinions, or testimony, need not be intimately familiar with why or how
the computers or software used by the expert works, so long as
additional foundations are laid.
In Connecticut v. Foreman,86 a criminal defendant attempted to
have his conviction overturned, in part, because the lower court wrongly
admitted computer generated, but non-enhanced, fingerprint evidence.87
As part of his argument, the defendant claimed that the state failed to
properly authenticate the computer-generated evidence since the
fingerprint expert did not know “how the software . . . manipulated or
converted the images [of fingerprints], what the rate of error was in
producing the images, or if there was any peer review of that scientific
methodology.”88 The court, relying upon Rule 901 and federal case law,
rejected the defendant’s argument and found that the State had laid
sufficient foundation for the admissibility of the evidence by showing
the computer technology relied on by the witness was in use throughout
the state, the expert was highly trained, the identification results were
independently verified, and by way of the unique nature of fingerprints
themselves.89 The court concluded that the expert had sufficient
knowledge of the processes to lay an adequate foundation, despite not
knowing the algorithms utilized in the computer programs or of any
published error rates for the program.90
However, a word of caution on the use of experts; if relying on an
expert to authenticate evidence, the expert and his or her opinions or
proposed testimony should be disclosed pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(a)(2).91 Failure to do so may make the expert’s
testimony, and thereby the expert’s authentication, impermissible at trial.
This was the lesson learned by counsel in Insight Technology v. Surefire,
LLC.,92 another post-Lorraine case, when defendant failed to identify the
witness it was planning to use to authenticate computer animations in a
patent case. Defendants attempted to argue that the failure was harmless
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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because the proffered animations “depict devices which are well known
to [plaintiff] and have been the subject of [the] litigation since the
outset;” the animations only show the devices “more clearly.”93 Plaintiff
objected to the expert’s opinion claiming it was prejudiced by the lack of
notice and did not have the chance to depose the expert.94 The court
agreed, and reasoned that plaintiff was indeed prejudiced because, in
part, the animations showed the devices “more clearly.”95 As a result,
the expert’s testimony was stricken.96 As for the animations, the court,
citing to Lorraine, held that “[t]o be admissible, the animations must be
authenticated by independent evidence or be self authenticating.”97 But,
in the absence of the expert’s testimony, “the animations are
unauthenticated drawings of unauthenticated devices” and were held
inadmissible and therefore not able to support the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.98
6. Computer Animations and Simulations
As referenced by the Insight Technology court, computer
animations are most often used by practitioners as demonstrative
evidence “‘to illustrate and explain a witness’s testimony,’”99 and to be
admissible, must be “‘authenticated by testimony of a witness with
personal knowledge of the content of the animation, upon a showing that
it fairly and adequately portrays the facts and that it will help to illustrate
the testimony given in the case.’”100 Such a standard has been held to be
applicable in both state101 and federal courts;102 however, when dealing

93. Id. at * 2.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *3 (citing FED. R. EVID. 901; Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 559
(D. Md. 2007)).
98. Id.
99. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 559 (quoting State v. Sayles, 662 N.W. 2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2003));
accord Insight Tech., 2007 WL 3244092, at *3 (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 559).
100. Insight Tech., 2007 WL 3244092, at *3 (quoting Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 559); see also
Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 560 (stating that “the most frequent methods of authenticating computer
animations [and simulations] are 901(b)(1) (witness with personal knowledge), and 901(b)(3)
(testimony of an expert witness)”).
101. See, e.g., Tull v. Fed. Express Corp., 197 P.3d 495, 500 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008) (noting a
computer animation used as a demonstrative aid must be a fair and accurate representation of the
evidence to which it relates, it must be relevant, and its probative value must not be substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, or unfair and harmful surprise); see also
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with the authenticity and admissibility of computer simulations,
practitioners should recognize the use of different standards in state and
federal courts. Although this point was briefly alluded to in Lorraine,
the next section of this Article will provide elaboration not contained in
Lorraine to help bring the case forward, and provide a more thorough
commentary on the law covering the admissibility of computer
simulations.103
Unlike computer animations, which are offered into evidence for
demonstrative purposes, computer simulations are a form of scientific
evidence offered for substantive purposes.104 “[S]ubstantive evidence
has independent probative value and can be used by an expert as the
basis of the expert’s opinion,” and, as a result, is subject to more
stringent reliability “tests.”105 Depending on the court in which the
proponent of the computer simulation was operating, such tests would
include either the standards elicited in Frye v. United States,106 Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 560 (citing People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602 (Colo. App. 2001); Clark v.
Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 536 (S.C. 2000)).
102. See, e.g., Colgan Air, Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d 580, 583-84 (E.D.
Va. 2008) (noting “demonstrative aids,” including “computer animations,” are authenticated based
on testimony from a witness that they are substantially accurate representations of what that witness
is trying to describe) (citation omitted)); Insight Tech., 2007 WL 3244092, at *3; Lorraine, 241
F.R.D. at 559 (“The use of computer animations is allowed when it satisfies the usual foundational
requirements for demonstrative evidence. At a minimum, the animation’s proponent must show the
computer simulation fairly and accurately depicts what it represents, whether through the computer
expert who prepared it or some other witness who is qualified to so testify, and the opposing party
must be afforded an opportunity for cross-examination.”) (quoting Friend v. Time Mfg. Co., No. 03343-TUC-CKJ, 2006 WL 2135807, at *7 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
103. One student commentator has posited that Lorraine does not effectively differentiate
between state and federal law when discussing the admissibility of computer simulations. See
Lindsay Kemp, Comment, Lorraine v. Markel: An Authoritative Opinion Sets the Bar for
Admissibility of Electronic Evidence (Except for Computer Animations and Simulations), 9 N.C. J.
L. & TECH. 16, 27 (2007) (“However, Lorraine hardly mentioned that the rules of admitting
scientific evidence [in federal court] are governed by Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, and
this omission could be confusing to a lawyer looking to Lorraine as an authoritative and allinclusive guide.”) (footnote omitted)); but see Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 560-61 (stating that “[u]se of
an expert witness to authenticate a computer simulation likely will also involve Federal Rules of
Evidence 702 and 703”).
104. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 560 (citing WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 900.03[1], at
900-21; IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS, § 4.09[4][a], [c] (2002 Lexis)); see also
Hon. Paul W. Grimm & Claudia Diamond, Low-Tech Solutions to High-Tech Wizardy: Computer
Generated Evidence, 37 MD. B.J. 5, 9-10 (2004).
105. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 900.07[d][ii], at 900-123.
106. 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923).
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Inc.,107 or some variation thereof.108 Whereas a court relying on the Frye
analysis must see if a novel theory and method used by the expert
witness have been generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community,109 a court using a Rule 702 and/or Daubert analysis must
determine whether the testimony, regardless of novelty, is based on
sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and the witness applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case.110
For example, in State v. Sipin,111 a defendant and his co-passenger
were allegedly traveling in the defendant’s vehicle at a high rate of speed
when the vehicle suddenly collided with a mailbox and a large tree.112
As a result of the crash, the defendant suffered from permanent brain
damage, and the co-passenger died from injuries sustained in the
crash.113 The State charged the defendant with vehicular homicide, but
there was a genuine dispute as to whether the defendant or the copassenger had been driving the vehicle at the time of the crash; when
local neighbors approached the accident scene, they noticed that both
men had been ejected from the car, and neither was present in the
driver’s seat.114 The co-passenger was found on the ground between the
passenger-side door and the tree, with only one foot in the car, and the
defendant was found about ten to fifteen feet behind the vehicle.115
In order to prove the defendant was the driver of the vehicle at the
time of the crash, the State sought to admit into evidence a computer
simulation generated by the “PC-CRASH” program, as well as the

107. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (adopting the standard for admission of expert testimony set forth in
Rule 702).
108. See Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post–Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific
and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 (2001) (providing an exhaustive
compilation of the various evidentiary standards used by particular courts).
109. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
110. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to the 2000
amendments (“Daubert set forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in assessing the
reliability of scientific expert testimony. The specific factors explicated by the Daubert Court are
(1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested . . . ; (2) whether the
technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate
of error of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and
controls; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific
community.”).
111. 123 P.3d 862 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
112. Id. at 864.
113. Id. at 865.
114. Id. at 864.
115. Id.
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accompanying testimony by the State’s PC-CRASH expert witness.116
In response, the defendant asserted that the computer generated evidence
was inadmissible under Frye, and the trial court conducted a Frye
hearing to determine the admissibility of the PC-CRASH simulation and
the expert witness’s testimony.117
During the Frye hearing, the expert witness testified that the PCCRASH simulation program involved “‘inputting’ variables from the
scene and the vehicle, such as steering, braking, and speed, [which]
would create a predictive image of the vehicle movement, based on the
laws of physics.”118 The expert could not provide any validation studies
that had been done on the use of the PC-CRASH program to simulate
the movement of a human body within the interior of a vehicle during a
car accident; however, the expert asserted that such simulations would
be identical to PC-CRASH system principles used to predict interaction
between a human body and the exterior of a vehicle.119
At the conclusion of the Frye hearing, the trial court admitted the
PC-CRASH system into evidence, and permitted the expert witness to
testify at trial.120 The defendant was convicted, and subsequently
appealed.121 On appeal, he contended that the PC-CRASH system had
not been validated for the use exercised by the expert witness in
reconstructing the accident.122
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals of Washington initially
recounted the standard under Frye to address the admissibility of
computer simulations as substantive evidence:
Jurisdictions that have addressed the issue uniformly hold that the
admissibility of computer-generated models or simulations (as opposed
to animations) as substantive proof or as the basis for expert testimony
regarding matters of substantive proof is conditioned upon a sufficient
showing that (1) the computer is functioning properly; (2) the input
and underlying equations are sufficiently complete and accurate (and
disclosed to the opposing party so that they can be challenged); and (3)
the program is generally accepted by the appropriate community of
scientists for use in the particular situation at hand. We agree with
these courts, and hold that . . . computer-generated simulations used as
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
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substantive evidence or as the basis for expert testimony regarding
matters of substantive proof must have been generated from computer
programs that are generally accepted by the appropriate community of
scientists to be valid for the purposes at issue in the case.123

The appellate court found that the PC-CRASH computer simulation
did not meet the requirements of Frye due to the two post-trial
declarations provided by the defendant, three scholarly papers, and
manuals for the PC-CRASH program that all suggested that there was a
“lack of consensus in the relevant scientific community” regarding the
use of the PC-CRASH program by the State.124 It should be noted that
although the Sipin court purportedly applied the Frye test and its central
focus of general acceptance within the relevant scientific community, the
three-factor test the court embraced was more akin to the post-Daubert
version of Rule 702. Specifically, the examination of sufficiently
complete input (i.e., sufficient underlying facts), and that the underlying
equations used by the computer program as part of its analysis are
sufficiently complete and accurate (i.e., reliable methods and principles).
Accordingly, the analysis applied by the court, which is more detailed

123. Id. at 868-69 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Ruffin ex rel. Sanders v.
Boler, 890 N.E.2d 1174, 1181, 1187 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (addressing admissibility of computer
simulation to “describe the contact forces that are experienced between [an] infant’s shoulder and
the maternal pelvis during labor”); State v. Phillips, 98 P.3d 838, 842-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)
(addressing admissibility of PC-CRASH computer simulation to predict movement of a vehicle in a
single-impact crash). The three-factor test mentioned by the Sipin court is drawn from Commercial
Union Insurance Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 591 N.E.2d 165, 168 (Mass. 1992), which, as suggested
by Lorraine, is often used by courts following Frye to gauge the admissibility of computer
simulations as substantive evidence. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 560 (D.
Md. 2007) (citing Commercial Union, 591 N.E.2d at 168; Bray v. Bi-State Dev. Corp., 949 S.W.2d
93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Kudlacek v. Fiat, 509 N.W.2d 603 (Neb. 1994)); see also State v. Clark,
655 N.E.2d 795, 812 (Ohio App. Ct. 1995) (“[W]hile the third prong of the test invokes the Frye
test, which has been rejected in Ohio, we believe the fact that other jurisdictions, including our own,
allow for the admission of computer-generated simulations or reconstructions speaks for the
reliability of such simulations within the relevant technical community.” (citations omitted)).
Interestingly, as with the Commercial Union court, the Sipin court did not question whether the
computer running the simulation program was running properly, or the input and underlying
equations were accurate. See Sipin, 123 P.3d at 868-69; Commercial Union, 591 N.E.2d at 168; but
see Bray, 949 S.W.2d at 97-98 (“Courts have not required the first requirement of the Commercial
Union guideline, that the computer be functioning properly, to be affirmatively shown in the
absence of any challenge thereto. . . . With respect to the second Commercial Union guideline, cases
generally require that the accuracy of the input be established. However, the relevant technical or
scientific community’s use of or reliance on such software has been held sufficient to establish the
accuracy of the software.”) (citations omitted)).
124. Sipin, 123 P.3d at 870.
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than the language in Frye itself, would result in the same outcome as if
Rule 702/Daubert had been used.
By contrast, in Turner v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Company,125 the plaintiff sued his insurer, defendant Liberty Mutual, for
allegedly breaching an insurance contract after the defendant failed to
pay insurance proceeds to the plaintiff after a fire destroyed his home.126
The defendant countered that the plaintiff was solely responsible for the
destruction of his home.127 To justify its contention, the defendant
sought to have an expert witness testify at trial regarding two reports.128
The first report concluded “the fire evolution could not have developed
as rapidly as it did without the introduction of accelerants into the floor
surfaces of the home.”129 The second report, which was based on
various computer simulations, noted that the fire would still have to “be
classified as incendiary.”130 To prevent the expert from testifying, the
plaintiff filed a motion in limine, and the U.S. District Court, Northern
District of Ohio, relying on Rule 702 and Daubert, analyzed the
admissibility of the computer simulations used as the underlying basis
for the expert’s report.131 Through its analysis, the court unquestionably
found the computer simulations to be inherently reliable, and therefore
admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert: the software was found to have
been sufficiently tested, was adequately subject to peer review and
publication, had known error rates for the court to consider, and the
computer simulation methodology was generally accepted by the
relevant scientific community.132
Reading the Sipin and Turner cases in tandem, the lesson to be
learned is, be it under Frye or the Rule 702/Daubert approach, courts
recognize that when computer simulations, as opposed to animations, are
offered into evidence, proponents must satisfy the authentication
requirements of Rule 901, and also must demonstrate that the evidence is
reliable. Under Rule 702/Daubert, this requires including evidence of a
sufficient factual basis, as well as proof that the analytical methodology

125. No. 4:07-cv-00163, 2007 WL 2713062 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2007).
126. Id. at *1.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *2-3.
132. Id. at *3-4. See also Silong v. United States, No. CV F 06-0474 LJO DLB, 2007 WL
2535126, at *1-3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2007) (applying Daubert factors to computer model
displaying potential injury to child during birth).
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used by the computer program is reliable and based on reliable
principles. Similarly, under a Frye analysis, courts are not likely to
adopt mere conclusory statements from the witness who performed the
simulation that experts in the same field have generally accepted, but,
instead, will demand evidence that demonstrates sufficient factual
“input,” and that the program itself is “valid,” meaning that the analysis
that it performs is the product of reliable methodology. It should be kept
in mind that the approach taken by the courts regarding admissibility of
computer simulations conjoins the standards governing authentication
under Rules 901 and 902 with the expert witness rules under Rules 702704, and thus an expert witness likely will be required to authenticate the
computer simulation.
B. Rule 902
For purposes of authentication, Rule 902 is markedly different from
its counterpart, Rule 901, under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule
902 provides that extrinsic evidence of authentication as a pre-condition
to admissibility is not required for certain types of proffered materials;
therefore, the requirement of Rule 901 that the exhibit must be shown to
be what it purports to be will be automatically met if the exhibit falls
into any of the classifications listed under Rule 902.133 The benefit of
this rule is easily apparent—by having an exhibit be “selfauthenticating,” it dispenses with the need of having an authenticating
witness come to trial and testify to her knowledge of and familiarity with
an exhibit. With countless documents and records now available online,
the application of Rule 902 to the digital realm stands to be a boon for
any given proponent of a particular exhibit, although, surprisingly,
lawyers and courts have been slow to take advantage of it.
Lorraine recognized that Rule 902, in its entirety, could provide for
the self-authentication of ESI, and explicitly noted Rules 902(5), 902(7),
and 902(11) as permitting self-authentication of electronic records.134
Of the three rules, Rule 902(5), which permits self-authentication of
official records, has been most readily used by other courts to justify the
self-authentication of official records posted on the websites of public
authorities.

133. FED. R. EVID. 902.
134. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 551 (D. Md. 2007) (citing FED. R.
EVID. 902(5), (7) & (11)).
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1. Self-Authentication of Official Publications under Rule 902(5)
Rule 902(5) provides for the self-authentication of “[o]fficial
publications,” which could include “[b]ooks, pamphlets, or other
publications purporting to be issued by public authority.”135 With this
point in mind, and relying on the ruling in Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.,136 the
Lorraine court noted that printed web pages from websites of public
authorities would qualify as self-authenticating “official publications”
under Rule 902(5).137 Taking into account the frequency with which
official publications from government agencies could impact pending
litigation, as well as the increasing tendency for such agencies to have
their own websites, Rule 902(5) could now be seen as providing a
convenient avenue for authenticating such publications.138
Most recently, in Williams v. Long,139 the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland determined whether printed web
pages from various Maryland State government websites could qualify
as self-authenticating official publications under Rule 902(5). In the
case, the plaintiffs alleged that their employer, the defendant, violated
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)140 by failing to compensate the
plaintiffs at the minimum wage and provide overtime pay.141 The
plaintiffs subsequently moved to conditionally certify a collective action,
and sought approval and facilitation of a notice to class members
potentially interested in joining the suit.142 In order to justify the
certification, the plaintiffs would have to prove there were other
individuals “similarly situated” to the plaintiffs; therefore, plaintiffs’
counsel attached five exhibits to the plaintiffs’ motion for certification,
which detailed the defendant’s alleged actions against those similarly
situated to the instant plaintiffs.143

135. FED R. EVID. 902(5).
136. No. Civ.A. 03-1605, 2004 WL 2347559, *1-2 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004) (holding printed
webpage from the website of the U.S. Census Bureau as self-authenticating under Rule 902(5)).
137. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 551 (citing E.I. DuPont, 2004 WL 2347556).
138. Id.
139. 585 F. Supp. 2d 679 (D. Md. 2008).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2008).
141. Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 682 (citing 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (West 2008)) (outlining the requirements for
certification of a class action under the FLSA).
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The court noted that two of the five exhibits consisted of printed
web pages from websites.144 The plaintiffs’ first exhibit was printed web
pages from the Maryland Judiciary Case search website,145 which had
not been authenticated by any attached affidavit or extrinsic evidence.146
A reading of the web pages revealed that there were three pending
lawsuits against the defendant in the Baltimore City District Court;
however, the suits were only described as “Contract” claims, and failed
to address the facts of each particular suit.147 Additionally, the plaintiffs’
third exhibit featured printed case search results from the Employment
Standards Service of the Division of Labor and Industry, in the
Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation.148 The
search results showed there were four closed claims against the
defendant, but not did mention the facts of each particular claim, and
were also not authenticated by any affidavit or extrinsic evidence.149
The court went on to consider each website that hosted the particular
web pages and found that access to the information contained in the
Employment Standards Service web pages was not available without an
employee e-mail address and password.150 At a subsequent hearing on
the plaintiffs’ motion, plaintiffs’ counsel proffered that he had obtained
the information contained in the third exhibit through a request for
records under the Maryland Public Information Act.151
Before addressing the applicability of Rule 902(5) to the plaintiffs’
submitted web pages, the Williams court defined the applicability of
Rule 902(5) to any information posted on the Internet.152 This resulted
in the court analyzing how a “public authority” was defined under the
rule, as well as an “other publication.”153 First, the court noted that
“‘Rule 902(5) [was] silent on what level of government must authorize
the publication’”;154 however, “‘Rule 902(5) [was] most often construed
to cover the governmental bodies listed in [Rule 902(1)], which provides
for self-authentication of domestic publication documents under

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 682-83.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 683.
Id.
See id. at 685-87.
Id. at 686-87.
Id. at 686 (quoting WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 902.07[1], at 902-29).
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seal.’”155 As a result, the following entities would be regarded as public
authorities: “(1) the United States, (2) any State, (3) any district,
commonwealth, territory, or insular possession of the United States, (4)
the Panama Canal Zone, (5) the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
[and] (6) a political subdivision, department, officer, or agency of any of
the preceding bodies.”156 The universe of public authorities, thus, is
broad. Second, the court remarked that Rule 902(5) would cover the
self-authentication of “‘statute books and case reports,’ as well as
‘legislative reports, published transcripts of hearings, maps and surveys,
collected statistics, commissioned studies, manuals,’ and other data
compilation publications from public authorities.”157
With these two points in mind, Williams recognized that courts
were accepting “the posting of information on a website sponsored by a
public authority [as] the functional equivalent of publication” under Rule
902(5).158 Accordingly, postings on “government websites” were

155. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 902(1).
156. Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 686 (quoting WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, §
902.07[1], at 902-30 & n.4).
157. Id. at 686-87 (quoting CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 9:34, at 589 (3d ed. 2007); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra, § 9:34, at 589
n.4 (citing Gregg v. Forsyth, 65 U.S. 179 (1860) (authentication of papers contained in volumes of
American State Papers); Watkins v. Holman’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 25, 39 (1842) (authentication of
“volume of state papers published . . . under an act of congress”); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 1 F.R.D. 71, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (authentication of a “public document, lawfully printed at
the Government Printing Office in obedience to a valid order made by the Senate”); United States v.
Shafer, 132 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D. Md. 1955), aff’d, 229 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1956) (authentication of
documents published in the Federal Register); Stewart v. United States, 211 F. 41, 45 (9th Cir.
1914) (authentication of a map from the General Land Office)); Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 687
(citing Conjour v. Whitehall Twp., 850 F. Supp. 309, 312 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (self-authentication of
local ordinances and regulations); Biggers ex. rel. Key v. S. Ry. Co., 820 F. Supp. 1409, 1415 (N.D.
Ga. 1993) (self-authentication of a certified copy of a state map issued by the Georgia Department
of Transportation)).
158. Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 687 (citing Sannes v. Jeff Wyler Chevrolet, Inc., No. C-1-97930, 1999 WL 33313134, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 1999) (recognizing the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”), an agency of a governmental body, as a public authority, and thereby
determining information published on the FTC’s website to be self-authenticating); Hispanic Broad.
Corp. v. Educ. Media Found., No. CV027134CAS (AJWX), 2003 WL 22867633, at *5 n.5 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 30, 2003) (“[E]xhibits which consist of records from government websites, such as the
FCC website, are self-authenticating.”); Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, No. CV 03-8846 NM (PJWx),
2004 WL 5615656, at *5 n.7 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2004) (noting “records from government websites
are self-authenticating,” and permitted a plaintiff to introduce internet reports from the U.S. State
Department website); Estate of Gonzales v. Hickman, No. ED CV 05-660 MMM (RCx), 2007 WL
3237727, at *2 n.3 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2007) (finding the Office of the Inspector General’s report to
be self-authenticating based on availability on the Internet)).
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Williams also noted the

A proponent of ESI could use the [uniform resource locator], date,
and/or official title on a printed webpage to show that the information
was from a public authority’s website, and therefore, selfauthenticating. . . . [T]he public authority’s selection of the posted
information for publication on its website [would act] as the necessary
“seal of approval” needed to establish that the information came from a
public authority for purposes of Rule 902(5).160

Through this method, the court found the printed web pages from
the Maryland Judiciary Case Search and Employment Standards Service
websites to be self-authenticating.161 Although access to the webpage
from the Employment Standards Service website was limited by security
measures, the court cautioned that it was important not to confuse
“‘publication,’ as used by Rule 902(5), with ‘unrestricted publication to
the general public.’”162 Rule 902(5) contains no requirement that
information must be readily available to the public, and simply because
additional measures, such as a subpoena or request or records, would
have to be employed to gain access to a publication does not mean that

159. Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 687. One court has, however, found that the type of
information found on a website may affect whether the information itself can be found to be selfauthenticating under Rule 902(5). See In re Poirier, 346 B.R. 585, 588-89 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006)
(declining to take judicial notice of information posted on the Department of Education’s (“DOE”)
website because there were too many links to various “documents” which could not be reasonably
identified as “official records,” “reports,” or a “publication issued by a public authority”); but see
Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 688 n. 4 (“The correctness of the conclusion reached by the In re
Poirier court is questionable. Rule 902(5) provides for self-authentication of ‘other publications,’
and it is the act of posting information on the Internet by a qualifying public authority that is the act
of publication. Because the DOE is a department of one of the governmental bodies listed in Rule
902(1), then the DOE would also be considered a public authority. Thus, when the DOE posted
information on its site, it vouched for its authenticity, thereby making it self-authenticating under
Rule 902(5). There is nothing in the rule that states the public authority publishing the information
(whether in print form, or online) must originate the information posted. Rather, the publication
must have actually been approved by the public authority, or, as some would say, ‘made official.’
Thus, the information’s adoption by reference by the public authority seems sufficient to meet the
requirements of Rule 902(5).”).
160. Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 689; see also, e.g., Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v.
Kempthorne, No. 3:06-cv-00081 (PCD), 2008 WL 4000179, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 26, 2008)
(finding Government press release to be self-authenticating because petitioner included the web
address for the press release in its Local Rule 56(a)(1) statement, thereby allowing the court to
verify that the press release was a copy of an official document issued by a public authority).
161. Williams, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 689.
162. Id. at 689-90.
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the publication could not be self-authenticating.163 Thus, if information
was published on a website by a public authority, and that information
was obtained pursuant to a federal or state freedom of information act,
then that printed information would in fact be self-authenticating under
Rule 902(5).164
2. Self-Authentication of Inscriptions under Rule 902(7)
Rule 902(7) permits the self-authentication of “[i]nscriptions, signs,
tags, or labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business
and indicating ownership, control, or origin.”165 As noted by one
commentator, “‘business e-mails often contain information showing the
origin of the transmission and identifying the employer-company.’”166
Therefore, “‘[t]he identification marker alone may be sufficient to
authenticate an e-mail under Rule 902(7).’”167 However, simply because
an individual’s sending address is present on an e-mail does not
constitute definitive proof that the person actually sent the e-mail, and
authentication of an e-mail could still possibly require testimony from a
person with personal knowledge of the transmission or its receipt to
ensure its trustworthiness.168
At this time, no case since Lorraine has discussed the use of Rule
902(7) to gauge the authenticity of an e-mail. Nevertheless, at least one
court has implicitly recognized the authenticity of an e-mail based on the
identity of its author. In Sklar v. Clough,169 students at the Georgia
Institute of Technology filed suit against various Georgia Tech officials,
alleging that Georgia Tech was banning the use of students’ activities
fees for religious and political activities, and unconstitutionally
establishing a specific religious view with the school’s “Safe Space
Program.”170 In their opposition to the students’ motion for summary

163. Id.
164. Id.; c.f. id. (citing Wolf Lake Terminals, Inc. v. Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 2d
933, 944 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (discussing the self-authentication of two U.S. Government documents
obtained through the FOIA); Schmutte v. Resort Condos. Int’l, LLC, No. 1:05-cv-0311-LJM-WTL,
2006 WL 3462656, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 29, 2006) (discussing the self-authentication of
Department of Labor file produced pursuant to a FOIA request)).
165. FED. R. EVID. 902(7).
166. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 551-52 (D. Md. 2007) (quoting
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 900.07[3][c], at 900-105).
167. Id. at 552 (quoting WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 900.07[3][c], at 900-105).
168. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, § 900.07[3][c][i], at 900-105.
169. No. 1:06-CV-0627-JOF, 2007 WL 2049698 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2007).
170. Id. at *1.
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judgment, the officials contended that various attached exhibits had “not
been properly authenticated, [were] hearsay, and [were] not otherwise
admissible at trial.”171 In particular, officials sought to exclude various
e-mails from school officials that purportedly detailed the extent of the
involvement of the Georgia Tech administration with the Safe Space
Program.172 Without relying on Rule 902(7), the court did find the emails to be “authenticated,” mainly “because they were produced by [the
school officials] in the litigation.”173 Other courts have frequently held
that if a document is produced by an opposing party during discovery,
then it is sufficiently authenticated, and will qualify as an admission of a
party opponent, thereby qualifying the document as non-hearsay under
Rule 801(d)(2).174 As a result, a proponent of an e-mail, which had been
sent in the regular course of business, could rely on an identification
marker to prove the e-mail came from a party opponent, thereby
guaranteeing its authenticity and admissibility.
3. Self-Authentication of Domestic Records under Rule 902(11)
Rule 902(11) provides for the following:
(11) Certified domestic records of regularly conducted activity. The
original or a duplicate of a domestic record of regularly conducted
activity that would be admissible under Rule 803(6) if accompanied
by a written declaration of its custodian or other qualified person, in a
manner complying with any Act of Congress or rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, certifying that the
record:
(A) was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set
forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge
of those matters;
(B) was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and
(C) was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice.
A party intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph
must provide written notice of that intention to all adverse parties, and
must make the record and declaration available for inspection

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *5.
174. See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l, 285 F.3d 808, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2002);
Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1988); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2006); In re Homestore.com, Inc., 347 F.
Supp. 2d 769, 781 (C.D. Cal. 2004). For a more thorough discussion on hearsay in an ESI context,
see infra Part IV.
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sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an
adverse party with a fair opportunity to challenge them.175

As recognized by the Lorraine court, compliance with Rule
902(11) requires a proponent of electronic evidence to establish all the
elements of the business record exception to the hearsay rule; therefore,
courts usually analyze an authenticity issue under Rule 902(11)
concomitantly with the business record exception under Rule 803(6).176
First, in Rambus, Inc. v. Infineone Technologies AG,177 a plaintiff
computer memory systems designer filed suit against a defendant
manufacturer for patent infringement.178 After the judgment in the trial
was appealed, affirmed, and reversed in part, the case was remanded.179
On remand, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the
plaintiff from entering into evidence fourteen third-party declarations,
and 148 documents purportedly self-authenticated by the declarations
through Rule 902(11).180 In its analysis, the court noted the following:
[T]he most appropriate way to view Rule 902(11) is as the functional
equivalent of testimony offered to authenticate a business record
tendered under Rule 803(6) because the declaration permitted by Rule
902(11) serves the same purpose as authenticating testimony.
Therefore, the declaration must satisfy the substantive criteria set forth
in Rule 902(11) in order to lay a proper foundation for admission of
the record.181

The court held that the declarations did not permit selfauthentication of the business entity’s records because the declarations
failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 902(11): the statements made
no reference to the third-party’s knowledge of the manufacturers’
recordkeeping practices and whether the records were made by regularly
conducted activity as regular practice.182
Second, in In re Vee Vinhnee,183 the appellate bankruptcy panel
relied on a merged Rule 902(11) and 803(6) analysis to uphold the trial
bankruptcy judge’s decision to exclude evidence of electronic business

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
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FED. R. EVID. 902(11).
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 571-72 (D. Md. 2007).
348 F. Supp. 2d 698 (E.D. Va. 2004).
Id. at 698.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 708.
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records.184 The court’s outcome hinged on the overall reliability of a
declarant’s statement authenticating the records; the court noted
dissatisfaction with the declarant’s knowledge of the hardware and
software used to produce the information, and remarked that the
declaration in no way established the declarant was “‘qualified’ to
provide the requisite testimony[, and] . . . the declaration did not contain
information sufficient to warrant a conclusion that the ‘ . . . computers
[were] sufficiently accurate in the retention and retrieval of the
information contained in the documents.’”185 Further, the court
remarked that a “‘qualified’ witness or person under Rules 803(6) and
902(11) need not be an expert,” but there would have to “be enough
information presented to demonstrate that the person is sufficiently
knowledgeable about the subject of the testimony.”186 The court did not
find that the declarant possessed the requisite knowledge, for he “merely
asserted” that he was “personally familiar with the hardware and
software computer record-keeping systems,” and failed to “indicate his
job title or anything about his training and experience that would import
an aura of verisimilitude to his assertions.”187
Following Lorraine, one court found that a declarant’s testimony
failed to meet the requirements of Rule 902(11). In United States v.
Schultz,188 the defendant was charged with allegedly using a government
credit card to purchase personal items. The defendant’s lawyer
contended that the defendant had committed the crimes because of
mental health issues, which resulted from mistreatment she supposedly
endured while training for and participating in the California National
Guard.189 As evidence, defense counsel wanted to submit, inter alia,
statements the defendant allegedly posted on Craig’s List discussing the
alleged abuse.190
The court initially declined to admit the defendant’s statement into
evidence, finding that that statement failed to meet the relevancy
requirement under Rule 402.191
Afterwards, the United States
Government sought to have other sections of the Craig’s List postings

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 444-50.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id.
No. Cr. S-07-76 KJM, 2008 WL 152132 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2008).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 402).
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admitted into evidence,192 and at a subsequent hearing, the court had to
determine whether these sections were self-authenticating under Rule
902(11)(A).193 Citing Rambus and United States v. Childs,194 the court
found that the sections were not self-authenticating; the Government
could not prove, “given the nature of the Craig’s List postings,” that the
records had been “‘made at or near the time of the occurrence of the
matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge of those matters.’”195
4. Self-Authentication of ESI under Rules 902(4) and 902(6)
Although not specifically addressed in Lorraine,196 courts have
begun to analyze the self-authentication of ESI under Rules 902(4) and
902(6).
a. Rule 902(4)
Rule 902(4) provides for self-authentication of the following:
A copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document
authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed
in a public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as
correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the
certification, by certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of
this rule or complying with any Act of Congress or rule prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.197

The primary purpose of Rule 902(4) is to make it unnecessary to
remove original records from their official custody for litigation, for
modern copying methods and the integrity of those certifying the copies
offer some assurance against the possibilities of mistake or fraud.198
Also, Rule 902(4)’s reference to “data compilations in any form” has
been interpreted to include electronically stored or recorded data and

192. United States v. Schultz, No. Cr. S-07-76 KJM, 2008 WL 162164, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
17, 2008).
193. Id.
194. 5 F.3d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that “exhibits can be admitted as business
records of an entity, even when that entity was not the maker of those records, so long as the other
requirements of Rule 803(6) are met and the circumstances indicate the records are trustworthy”).
195. Schultz, 2008 WL 162164, at *2 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 902(11)(A)).
196. See 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007).
197. FED. R. EVID. 902(4).
198. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 157, §9:33, at 571.
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computer output,199 and at least one case preceding Lorraine has
discussed whether an electronic record could be self-authenticating
under Rule 902(4). In Brewer v. United States,200 the plaintiff failed to
file tax returns for a number of years, prompting the Government to
obtain liens on the plaintiff’s property, issue levies, and seize and sell the
plaintiff’s property.201 Instead of challenging the merits of the tax
assessments, the plaintiff brought suit to quiet title of his past wages, an
annuity fund, and property in Florida and New York.202 In response, the
Government filed a motion to dismiss.203
The court granted the Government’s motion, and in doing so, relied
on information contained in an Internal Revenue Service Form 4340,
Certificate of Assessments and Payments, which was originally
submitted by the Government as an attachment to the motion.204 The
plaintiff had moved to strike the document, arguing that it was
improperly authenticated and inadmissible hearsay.205 The court
declined to agree with the plaintiff, and noted that “Form 4340 [was] a
compilation of data stored in a computer, reflecting entries into an
official record.”206 Additionally, the accompanying signature of a
custodian “attest[ed] to the accuracy of the completed form,” thereby
making it “properly admissible under Rule 902(4).”207 Such a finding
highlights an important point when relying on Rule 902(4) when selfauthenticating ESI—as required by Rule 902(4), a proponent of ESI
must still obtain a certificate of a custodian in order to ensure the
information is true, accurate, and was properly recorded. If not, then the
ESI will not fall under the purview of Rule 902(4), and as a result, will
not be self-authenticating.208

199. Id. at 572; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to the 1972 proposed
rules (“The expression ‘data compilation’ is used as broadly descriptive of any means of storing
information other than the conventional words and figures in written or documentary form. It
includes, but is by no means limited to, electronic computer storage.”).
200. 764 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
201. Id. at 311.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 313.
204. Id. at 318.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., In re Lebbos, No. 06-22225-D-7, 2008 WL 2474579, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
June 18, 2008).
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b. Rule 902(6)
Rule 902(6) provides that printed materials, such as newspapers or
periodicals, are self-authenticating.209 Contrary to the assertion made in
Lorraine, one scholarly authority notes that because the rule references
“printed” materials, it would be difficult to use Rule 902(6) to
“authenticate electronic or hardcopy of material made available only
over the Internet, such as Slate magazine, to wire service reports like
Reuters.”210 One could also argue that the proliferation of electronic
records defeats the original purpose of the rule itself; self-authentication
under Rule 902(6) was permissible because it seemed exceedingly
difficult to forge a newspaper or periodical because of distinct
appearance, typeset, logo, and other discernible characteristics,211 but
with the accessibility of electronic versions of such newspapers and
periodicals, it would be much easier craft forgeries through the technical
advancements of photo-editing software and/or data manipulation.212
This troublesome, but perhaps resolvable aspect of relying on Rule
902(6) to self-authenticate ESI was recently mentioned in Parikh v.
Premera Blue Cross:213
The problem the Court now faces is the fact that all of the newspaper
or other periodical articles submitted by Defendant appear to have been
printed from an internet media search service. The original clippings,
or even photocopies of the originals, are not provided. Instead, the
Court has merely received what appears to be the purported text of the
articles typed into and printed from a computer. There are no
distinctive headlines, nor are there any unique typesetting techniques
employed that would make these purported copies of original text
difficult to forge. Additionally, in many cases, the Court cannot tell
from which internet service the documents were obtained. The Court
questioned the Defense attorney about these documents at oral
argument and he admitted to the Court that he had no personal
knowledge regarding where these documents were found on the
internet because he had an assistant obtain these documents for him.

209. FED. R. EVID. 902(6).
210. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 20, § 902.02[4], at 902-10.
211. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 157, §9:35, at 592; See, e.g., Goguen ex rel. Estate
of Goguen v. Textron, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 13, 17 n.2 (D. Mass. 2006).
212. See, e.g., Colin Miller, Even Better Than the Real Thing: How Courts Have Been
Anything but Liberal in Finding Genuine Questions Raised as to the Authenticity of Originals under
Rule 1003, 68 MD. L. REV. 160, 207-209 (2008).
213. No. C01-0476P, 2006 WL 2841998, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 29, 2006).
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For these reasons, the Court must reject the articles submitted by
Defendants as non-self-authenticating.214

In an ESI context, such a ruling is a proverbial two-sided coin;
attorneys should be aware that they cannot simply use a word processing
program to retype a periodical into a computer and expect a court to
recognize the output as self-authenticating under Rule 902(6), but they
should also recognize that the court has provided a rough framework as
to how online accessible periodicals can be self-authenticating under the
federal rules. First, a proponent would most likely have to show that the
printout of the periodical came from the periodical’s website—this could
be done by making sure the URL appears at the top of the printed page.
Second, the proponent would most likely have to show to the court that
the webpage of the online periodical uses a specific or particular font,
which is comparable to the practices of most paper periodicals. There
would be, of course, additional considerations not considered by the
Parikh court. When analyzing issues involving the definition of
“periodicals” under Rule 902(6), courts often focus on the printing
schedule of the article, magazine, or newsletter to establish if the written
piece is truly a “periodical” in the classical sense.215 Therefore, online
versions of articles on the Newsweek website, which are posted on a
predetermined basis, may soon be held to be self-authenticating under
the rule, and a retyped article from a news blog will not. Given the
changes that the newspaper industry presently is undergoing, “online”
publications by former “print-based” publishers can be expected to grow
exponentially. Lawyers and courts, therefore, will be called upon with
greater regularity to rely on Rule 902(6) as a basis for authenticating
these publications.
IV. THE HEARSAY RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS AS APPLIED TO
ESI/DIGITAL EVIDENCE
Lorraine also discusses at length the special challenges presented
by the hearsay rule when applied to ESI or digital evidence. As the
opinion notes, the key to proper understanding of this issue hinges on a
five-step analysis:
The fourth “hurdle” that must be overcome when introducing
electronic evidence is the potential application of the hearsay rule.

214. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
215. See Goguen, 234 F.R.D. at 17-18.
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Hearsay issues are pervasive when electronically stored and generated
evidence is introduced. To properly analyze hearsay issues there are
five separate questions that must be answered: (1) does the evidence
constitute a statement, as defined by Rule 801(a); (2) was the
statement made by a “declarant,” as defined by Rule 801(b); (3) is the
statement being offered to prove the truth of its contents, as provided
by Rule 801(c); (4) is the statement excluded from the definition of
hearsay by rule 801(d); and (5) if the statement is hearsay, is it
covered by one of the exceptions identified at Rules 803, 804 or 807.
It is critical to proper hearsay analysis to consider each of these
questions.216

Lorraine explains that the core purpose of the hearsay rule is to
ensure sufficient reliability of testimonial evidence that asserts the
existence of facts and invites the finder of fact to accept them as true,
and recognizes the four common law “testimonial risks” that the hearsay
rule is designed to address: perception, memory, sincerity, and
narration.217 The hearsay rules accomplish this by insisting on the
presence before the jury of the person making the assertions, so that his
credibility may be assessed through testimony given under oath, tested
by cross-examination, with the jury in a position to observe the
demeanor of the witness during the process.218 Central to this concept is
the requirement in Rule 801(a) of a “statement,” which is a term of art
with a specific meaning—written or spoken utterances (referred to as
“verbal conduct”) as well as non-verbal conduct that is expressly
intended by the actor to be assertive.219 The Lorraine opinion notes the
irony of the fact that despite its paramount importance to the operation
of the hearsay rule, the word “assertion” is not defined by the Rule 801,
but offers the following practical definition: “An assertion usefully may
be defined as ‘to state as true; declare; maintain.’”220
The next requirement of the hearsay rule is that the statement be
made by a human being, referred to by Rule 801(b) as the “declarant,”
and this is particularly relevant to ESI/digital evidence, and the source of
much confusion.221 When ESI or digital evidence is produced from a
computer or other electronic device, it may be either “computer
216.
217.
rules).
218.
219.
220.
221.
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generated” or “computer stored.”222 The difference is significant for
purposes of the hearsay rule, and George Paul’s recent treatise on digital
evidence has explained it quite well:
[C]ourts and commentators have recognized a distinction between
computer-generated and computer-stored evidence. If the system
made the statement, it is “computer-generated.” If a person input a
statement into the system that then preserved a record of it, it is
“computer-stored” evidence. Underlying the distinction is the idea that
computer-stored evidence is a repetition of data originally entered by a
human language writer, while computer-generated evidence is the
product of electronic processes, or the statements an information
system makes in its reading and writing games.223

Thus, as Lorraine notes, if the electronic or digital evidence was
not created by a human declarant, then it cannot constitute hearsay, and
courts have repeatedly overruled hearsay objections aimed at excluding
“assertive” statements generated by a computer or machine, not a
human.224 Since Lorraine, courts have continued to recognize the
requirement of a “human” declarant before factual statements generated
by computers or other machines may be regarded as hearsay.225
While Lorraine and the cases cited in the opinion conclude that
computer-generated statements do not constitute hearsay, they are quick
to caution that this does not mean the evidence gets a “free pass” to
admissibility. To the contrary, because the statements are computer- or
machine-generated, they are only admissible if reliable, meaning that
they must be the product of a system or process that is capable of

222. PAUL, supra note 5, at 115.
223. Id. at 115-16 (citing Tatum v. Commonwealth, 440 S.E.2d 133 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)).
224. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 564-65 (citing United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 (3d
Cir. 2003) (header of a faxed document not hearsay because hearsay rule requires that the statement
be “uttered by ‘a person,’” so nothing “said” by a machine is hearsay); United States v. Rollins, No.
ACM34515, 2004 WL 26780, at *9 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 24, 2003) (computer generated
records are not hearsay), rev’d in part on other grounds, 61 M.J. 338 (C.A.A.F. 2005); State v.
Dunn, 7 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (computer generated billing record not hearsay);
State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 147 (Tenn. 1998) (computer generated records are not hearsay
because they are not statements of a witness))..
225. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding
machine-generated data produced by forensic laboratory equipment that reflected blood alcohol
level of defendant and presence of PCP not hearsay because they were not made by human
declarant, but rather were generated by machine’s diagnostic and technical analysis of defendant’s
blood).
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producing a reliable result,226 which is a function of the authentication
rules, specifically Rule 901(b)(9).227
Despite the analysis in Lorraine, the cases cited therein, and the
authorities referenced in this Article, not all courts are so quick to draw
the admittedly subtle distinction between computer-generated and
computer-stored statements for purposes of determining whether the
records produced by the computer are “statements” made by a “human
declarant” for purposes of application of the hearsay rule. Rather, they
assume without analysis that the record generated by the computer is
hearsay because it contains factual assertions, but then admit it under
one of the many hearsay exceptions that cover various records or
documents.228 As George Paul has observed:
However, in some cases, courts simply assume that computergenerated information is hearsay, without performing an analysis,
seemingly avoiding the preliminary issue [of whether the information
constitutes the “statement” of a “human declarant”]. These courts
analyze objections to admissibility by searching for a hearsay

226. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 565 (citing Rollins, 2004 WL 26780, at *9; Dunn, 7 S.W.3d at
432; Hall, 976 S.W.2d at 147).
Any concerns about the reliability of such machine-generated information is addressed
through the process of authentication not by hearsay or Confrontation Clause analysis.
When information provided by machines is mainly a product of “mechanical
measurement or manipulation of data by well-accepted scientific or mathematical
techniques,” reliability concerns are addressed by requiring the proponent to show that
the machine and its functions are reliable, that it was correctly adjusted or calibrated, and
that the data . . . put into the machine was accurate . . . . In other words, a foundation
must be established for the information through authentication, which Federal Rule of
Evidence 901(b)(9) allows such proof to be authenticated by evidence “describing [the]
process or system used to produce [the] result’ and showing it ‘produces an accurate
result.”
Washington, 498 F.3d at 231. See also SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 10
(“System metadata does not constitute ‘hearsay,’ at least not under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
because system metadata is generated by a computer without human assistance. The reason is that
under the Federal Rules of Evidence ‘hearsay,’ by definition, requires human input.”).
227. FED. R. EVID. 901(b) (“By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this
rule: . . . (9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result
and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.”).
228. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 568 (noting the following hearsay exceptions recognized by FED.
R. EVID. 803 for documents, records and other writings: 803(5) (past recollection recorded); 803(6)
& (7) (business records); 803 (8) & (10) (public records); 803(9) (records of vital statistics); 803(11)
(records of religious organizations); 803(12) (certificates of baptism, marriage, and related events);
803(13) (family records); 803(14) (records of documents affecting an interest in property); 803(15)
(statements in documents affecting an interest in property); 803(16) ancient documents); 803(18)
(learned treatises)).
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exception, which they nearly always find. And courts that hold that
computer-generated information is hearsay often complicate matters by
using the term ‘computer-generated information’ loosely, lumping all
evidence that comes from a computer together, and failing to focus on
whether what is really at issue is computer-stored information—often
usually hearsay under anyone’s definition.229

The take-away lesson from Lorraine’s discussion of Rule 801(b) as
it applies to electronic or digital evidence is that adherence to the five
step analysis the opinion describes will ensure that the correct result is
achieved—proper distinction between computer-stored statements
initiated by a human declarant, which are excluded unless covered by a
hearsay exception, and computer-generated non-hearsay statements, that
are not admissible unless authenticated by showing that they were
generated by a system or process capable of producing a reliable
result.230
The Lorraine opinion further notes that the third requirement of the
hearsay rule is that the “statement” at issue be offered into evidence to
prove its substantive truth, or as Rule 801(c) puts it, hearsay “is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.”231 So, for example, if evidence that would constitute a
“statement” under Rule 801(a), is made by a human declarant as
required by 801(b) but is offered for some purpose other than its literal
truth, it cannot be hearsay. Examples of when a statement is not offered
for its substantive truth, but may be relevant for some other purpose,
include those offered to prove the communicative or comprehensive
capacity of the declarant, those offered as circumstantial evidence of the
state of mind of the declarant, statements that are offered not for their
truth but instead to show the conduct of someone who heard them, (to
prove that they had knowledge of the information, or to explain what
they did after having heard it), statements that constitute “verbal acts” or
parts of acts, and statements that have relevance even if not true.232
The Lorraine opinion also cites examples where ESI/digital
evidence that might at first blush be regarded as hearsay was found not
to be: e-mail evidence between a co-worker and the defendant was held
not to be hearsay because it was not offered for its truth, but merely to
229.
230.
231.
232.

PAUL, supra note 5, at 119 (citations omitted).
See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 565 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(c)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 565-66.
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demonstrate that a relationship existed between the sender and
recipient;233 e-mails were admitted as non-hearsay in a criminal case
because they were not offered for their substantive truth, but rather to
show how a lobbyist attempted to influence a government official, and to
prove the official’s intent and state of mind;234 and exhibits showing the
defendant’s website content on a particular day were not hearsay,
because they were not offered to prove their literal truth, but rather to
prove that they infringed on plaintiff’s trademark and copyright.235
Given the frequency with which circumstantial evidence is offered to
prove a party’s state of mind, it may be expected that ESI/digital
evidence such as e-mail, instant messages, and text messages will be
offered for this purpose, and if not also offered for the truth of these
statements, such use would remove the evidence from the reach of the
hearsay rule. Similarly, as the hypothetical at the start of this Article
illustrates, evidence of the content of web sites also is likely to be
offered into evidence for reasons other than its literal truth, for example,
to prove that the contents were false, inaccurate, or misleading.
Similarly, website content may also be offered to prove violations of
copyright or trademark protection, to demonstrate unfair competition, or
to prove the publication of defamatory statements. In each of these
examples, the content of the website would not be offered for its
substantive truth, and thus would not be hearsay.
Lorraine further notes that the final step to determining whether
ESI/digital evidence is hearsay is to see if the evidence is exempted from
the definition of hearsay by Rule 801(d). That rule identifies two
categories of out of court statements: certain “prior statements” by
witnesses who actually testify at trial and are susceptible to cross
examination about the earlier statement, under Rule 801(d)(1), and
admissions by party opponents, under Rule 801(d)(2).236 As for Rule
801(d)(2), it can be expected that admissions will frequently be proved
by ESI/digital evidence, because the use of electronic communication is
ubiquitous. Indeed, the spontaneity and informality of e-mail, text
messaging, and instant messaging may make these forms of digital
evidence especially good candidates for evidentiary admissions, and

233. Id. at 566 (citing United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000)).
234. Id. (citing United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 44 (D.D.C. 2006)).
235. Id. (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1155 (C.D.
Cal. 2002)).
236. Id. at 567 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)-(2)).
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courts are already familiar with the introduction of digital admissions
such as e-mail.237
A. Rule 803 Hearsay Exceptions
While the Lorraine opinion stresses the importance of the four step
analysis to properly determine whether digital evidence is hearsay in the
first instance,238 it also reminds us that a determination that digital
evidence is hearsay is, in a sense, only the start of the analysis, for there
is no shortage of hearsay exceptions that courts have applied to ESI:
If, after applying the foregoing four-step analysis, it is determined that
the electronic evidence constitutes a statement by a person that is
offered for its substantive truth and is not excluded from the definition
of hearsay by Rule 801(d)(1) or (2), then the evidence is hearsay and is
inadmissible unless it qualifies as one of many hearsay exceptions
identified by Rule 803, 804 and 807.239

Focusing first on Rule 803, the Lorraine opinion notes that there
are twenty-three separate exceptions, sharing the common characteristic
that “[a]ll twenty-three are admissible regardless of whether the
declarant is available to testify.”240 The opinion points out that despite
the large number of exceptions in Rule 803, they may usefully be
grouped into three categories: (1) those dealing with perceptions,
observations, state of mind, intent and sensation;241 (2) exceptions that
involve documents, records, and other writings;242 and (3) statements

237. See, e.g., Siddiqui, 235 F.3d at 1323 (holding the e-mail defendant authored was not
hearsay because it was an admission); Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 43-44 (holding the e-mail sent
by defendant was an admission, therefore not hearsay); Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar
Satellite Corp., No. 02 C 3292, 2004 WL 2367740, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (holding the images and
text posted on defendant’s website were admissions, not hearsay); Perfect 10, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d
at 1153-55 (holding the e-mail sent by employees of defendant constituted admissions under Rule
801(d)(2)(D)); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 568.
238. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 562-63.
239. Id. at 568.
240. Id.
241. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(1), present sense impressions, FED. R. EVID. 803(2), excited
utterances, FED. R. EVID. 803(3), then existing state of mind, condition or sensation, and FED. R.
EVID. 803(4), statements in furtherance of medical diagnosis and treatment).
242. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(5) (past recollection recorded); FED. R. EVID. 803(6)-(7),
(dealing with business records); FED. R. EVID. 803(8) & (10) (dealing with public records); FED. R.
EVID. 803(9) (records of vital statistics); FED. R. EVID. 803(11) (records of religious organizations);
FED. R. EVID. 803(12) (certificates of baptism, marriage, and related events); FED. R. EVID. 803(13),
(family records); FED. R. EVID. 803(14) (records affecting an interest in property); FED. R. EVID.
803(15) (statements in documents affecting an interest in property); FED. R. EVID. 803(16) (ancient
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dealing with reputation.243 With respect to these three categories of
exceptions, the court observed:
Given the widely accepted fact that most writings today are created
and stored in electronic format, it is easy to see that the many types of
documents and writings covered in Rule 803 will implicate electronic
writings.
Similarly, given the ubiquity of communications in
electronic media (e-mail, text messages, chat rooms, internet posting
on servers like “Myspace” or “Youtube” or on blogs, voice mail, etc.),
it is not surprising that many statements involving observations of
events surrounding us, statements regarding how we feel, our plans
and motives, and our feelings (emotional and physical) will be
communicated in electronic medium.244

Despite the large number of exceptions contained in Rule 803,
Lorraine notes only a handful of exceptions frequently have been
invoked in connection with digital evidence, most of them found in Rule
803.245 One of these exceptions, 803(1), deals with present sense
impressions, which are statements describing or explaining an event
while it is being perceived, or immediately thereafter.246 Anyone who
has ever had a telephone conversation with someone and heard them
typing on a computer while they are talking, or sent an e-mail, instant
message, or text message to another describing an event as it was
happening or immediately thereafter can imagine how often this hearsay
exception may be applicable to ESI/digital evidence. Similarly,
Lorraine points out that Rules 803(2) (excited utterances) and 803(3)
(then existing state of mind or condition) also can be expected to apply
to digital evidence with some frequency.247 Courts can be expected to
apply the same level of scrutiny to ESI/digital evidence as they had in
the past applied to “paper” documents in determining whether the

documents); FED. R. EVID. 803(17) (market compilations and directories); FED. R. EVID. 803(18)
(learned treatises); FED. R. EVID. 803(22) (dealing with judgments of conviction in criminal cases);
FED. R. EVID. 803(23) (dealing with judgments in certain civil cases)).
243. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(19) (reputation regarding personal or family history); FED.
R. EVID. 803(20) (reputation regarding land custom, use and practice associated with land, and
historically significant facts); FED. R. EVID. 803(21) (reputation regarding character within the
community and among associates)).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 569.
246. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
247. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 569-570.
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have

been

1. Business Records Exception under Rule 803(6)
The business records exception found at Rule 803(6) is another
frequently used basis for admitting digital evidence:
The business record exception is one of the hearsay exceptions most
discussed by courts when ruling on the admissibility of electronic
evidence. The decisions demonstrate a continuum running from cases
where the court was very lenient in admitting electronic business
records, without demanding analysis, to those in which the court took a
very demanding approach and scrupulously analyzed every element of
the exception, and excluded evidence when all were not met.249

The Lorraine opinion concludes:
The lesson to be taken from these cases is that some courts will require
the proponent of electronic business records or e-mail evidence to

248. Id. (citing United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp 90 (D. Mass. 1997) (concluding that an email from employee to a supervisor qualified as a present sense impression under Rule 803(1), but
did not qualify as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2), simply because the e-mail ended with the
words “my mind is mush”); New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233(CKK), 2002 WL
649951, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002) (concluding that an e-mail that described the contents of a
telephone conference sent several days after the call did not qualify as a present sense impression
under Rule 803(1) because it was not made contemporaneously with, or immediately after the call));
but see Canatxx Gas Storage Ltd. v. Silverhawk Capital Partners, LLC., No. H-06-1330, 2008 WL
1999234, at *13 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2008) (noting “[e]mail is admissible under the present-sense
impression exception to the hearsay rule” if there is sufficient contemporaneousness of the event
and the e-mail describing it).
249. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 572; see, e.g., United States v. Kassimu, 188 F. App’x 264, 265
(5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the business record exception was established for computer-generated
records by the testimony of a witness familiar with the record keeping system of the business); SeaLand Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l, 285 F.3d 808, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that digital records
were admissible as business records on showing that they had been produced from same electronic
information generated at the time the contract was created, and noting that “it is immaterial that the
business record is maintained in a computer rather than in company books”); contra Microsoft
Corp., 2002 WL 649951, *2 (holding that an employee e-mail did not qualify as business record
without a showing that it was the regular practice of the employer to require the employee to make
and maintain the e-mail for a business purpose, and requiring that, for e-mail chains, each
participant must be acting in the regular course of the business in contributing to the e-mail chain);
Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 348 F .Supp. 2d 698, 706-707 (E.D. Va. 2004) (requiring that
each participant in an e-mail chain must be acting in the course of the business’s regular activities in
order for the chain to qualify as a business record); In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 445 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2005) (utilizing a very demanding approach in assessing whether computer generated credit
card records were business records, and expressing concern about the possibility that records could
have been altered or modified after being scanned into computerized database).
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make an enhanced showing in addition to meeting each element of the
business records exception. These courts are concerned that the
information generated for use in litigation may have been altered,
changed or manipulated after its initial input, or that the programs and
procedures used to create and maintain the records are not reliable or
accurate.250

Courts that appreciate that employees often use their business
computer to send personal e-mails are more likely to be inclined to
require strict adherence to each element of Rule 803(6) before they are
willing to admit e-mail as a business record. A good example of such a
case, decided after Lorraine, is Canatxx Gas Storage Limited v.
Silverhawk Capital Partners, LLC.,251 where the court held:
Neither a paper document, such as a letter or memo or note, nor an
email, falls within the business-records exception of Rule 803(6)
simply because it concerns a business matter. Courts have held that
conventional letters, memos, or notes are admissible under the business
records exception if they are regularly made in furtherance of the
employer’s needs and not for the personal purposes of the employee
who made them. Courts have applied a similar approach to emails. A
party seeking to introduce an email made by an employee about a
business matter under the hearsay exception under Rule 803(6) must
show that the employer imposed a business duty to make and maintain
such a record. Courts examine whether it was the business duty of an
employee to make and maintain emails as part of his job duties and
whether the employee routinely sent or received and maintained the
emails.252

This is an important point. As demonstrated above, many forms of
digital communication that are associated with personal communications
have migrated into the business arena, including text messages,
blogging, and instant messaging. Courts can be expected to require the
proponent of such evidence to make a clear showing that the digital
evidence relates to a regular activity of the business itself, as opposed to
the personal use of its creator, and that the business imposed on the
employee a requirement to make a digital record of the occurrence, and
thereafter to maintain that record for purposes of the future use by the
company. This raises an interesting issue. Many organizations and
businesses have electronic records management systems in place that
250. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 574.
251. 2008 WL 1999234.
252. Id. at *12 (citations omitted).
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automatically delete e-mails after a specific period, such as ninety
days.253 In such instances, unless the organization or business also
requires that certain types of e-mail that are important to the effective
operation of the organization are maintained in a saved file for future
business purposes, then it may be difficult to prove that they constitute
business records, because Rule 803(6) requires that they be “kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity.”254 It may be difficult
to show that the e-mail are “kept” for a “business activity” if they are
routinely and automatically deleted without being saved to a file where
they will continue to be available for business purposes.
In addition to the question of whether e-mail or other digital records
meet the requirements of Rule 803(6) that they be made for a business
purpose, a number of commentators have expressed grave concern that
when it comes to computerized evidence, there has been a significant
erosion of the requirement that a business record be the product of a
trustworthy process. This requirement is explicit in the rule itself, which
provides that even if the record is made for a business purpose,
contemporaneously with the events described within, by someone with
personal knowledge of those facts, and the regularity requirements are
met, the record nonetheless must be excluded if “the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack
of trustworthiness.”255 In his book, George Paul meticulously lays out
exactly what the problem is when the trustworthiness requirement of the
business record exception is overlooked and the regularity requirement
is the only criterion for admissibility of digital evidence:
Now, regularity of preparation has become the key to admitting
business records including records containing computer-generated
information. And if regularity is the test, almost any computergenerated information qualifies, without any showing of reliability.
Accordingly, both the hearsay rule—and the main exception used to
test admissibility of statements of information systems under it—
become trivial, without any meaningful competency determination by
a court. The ability to exclude out-of-court statements, the hearsay
rule, appears to have largely evaporated with regard to computergenerated information. Rather, in almost every case, all computer

253. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s notes to the 2006 amendments
(noting the revised rule “focuses on a distinctive feature of computer operations, the routine
alteration and deletion of information that attends ordinary use”).
254. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (emphasis added).
255. Id.
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evidence is admitted and things go to weight of the evidence. That
may be our final, preferred policy, after rule makers and thinkers
address this issue during the coming years, but in the meantime
practitioners should acknowledge the reality of where the law has
drifted.256

George Paul further observes that:
[C]ourts also now overlook the caveat in Rule 803(6) that allows
admission ‘unless the source of the information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.’ Courts
overwhelmingly find that problems concerning the accuracy of
computer-generated evidence go to the weight of the evidence, not
admissibility.257

There is, however, a problem with this approach:
When courts exclude both the trustworthiness caveat from their 803(6)
foundational inquiry, and an explicit preliminary authenticity analysis
as a prerequisite for admission, there is a high probability (if not
certainty) that any out-of-court statement made by an information
system will be admitted. This is significant, because jurors give
computer-generated evidence a high level of credibility, much as
scientific evidence is interpreted by jurors to have an “aura of
credibility.”258

George Paul concludes with this cautionary observation:
Clearly, when applying the rationale of the business records exception
to computer generated evidence, “important differences” have “eluded
consideration.” For example, computer-generated evidence does not
become more accurate from “regularity of preparation.” Unlike
humans, where repeated action trains an individual ‘in habits of
precision,’ computers do not become more accurate each time they
produce a result. . . .
Just because businesses rely on faulty computer programs does not
necessarily mean that courts should follow suit. Without requiring
some preliminary showing of reliability, a court will simply have no
idea what caliber of information system produced the result or what
measures, if any, the business took to protect the integrity of the
system. When considering the duty judges have to ensure the accuracy

256. PAUL, supra note 5, at 120.
257. Id. at 125 (citations omitted).
258. Id. at 125-26.
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of evidence considered by the jury, blindly admitting computergenerated evidence without any foundation is a system that, in essence,
does away with the hearsay rule and that allows everything to go to the
weight.259

George Paul is not alone in his concern that courts have become too
lax in admitting computer-generated evidence as business records
without a sufficient showing of the reliability of the system that
produced them. The Commentary of the widely respected Sedona
Conference regarding ESI evidence and admissibility,260 also published
after the issuance of the Lorraine opinion, raises similar concerns. It
stresses the importance of being aware that ESI/digital evidence is
prepared, stored and used within a “threat landscape” that includes the
availability of “anti-forensics.”261 The Commentary raises the following
warning:
Courts and litigants need to become familiar with anti-forensic tools
and not become bedazzled by technology, which some fear is
occurring. In a paper that appeared in the Journal of Digital Forensic
Practice, Vincent Liu and coauthor Eric Van Buskirk flout the U.S.
courts’ faith in digital forensic evidence. Liu and Van Buskirk cite a
litany of cases that established, as one judge put it, computer records’
“prima facie aura of reliability.” One decision even stated that
computer records were “uniquely reliable in that they were computergenerated rather than the result of human entries.” Liu and Van
Buskirk take exception to this viewpoint. The “unfortunate truth” they
conclude, is that the presumption of reliability is unjustified and the
justice system is “not sufficiently skeptical of that which is offered up
as proof.”262

The Lorraine decision did not involve a challenge to the
admissibility of ESI/digital evidence offered as a business record, and its
discussion of the cases that had, to date, analyzed this important hearsay
exception in the context of such evidence pointed out the continuum of
cases where courts have shown, at times, both extreme deference as well
as hostility to admitting digital evidence under this exception. The

259. Id. at 129.
260. SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY, supra note 4.
261. Anti-forensics is defined as “the employment of sophisticated tools and methods used for
the intentional fabrication and/or manipulation of ESI on a computer system intended to thwart
forensic examination. In short, anti-forensics is digital forgery.” Id. at 16.
262. Id. (quoting Eric Van Buskirk & Vincent T. Liu, Digital Evidence: Challenging the
Presumption of Reliability, 1 J. DIGITAL FORENSICS PRACTICE 19, 25 (2006)).
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important lesson to be learned for the future development of this critical
area of evidence law is that the concerns raised by George Paul’s book
and the Sedona Conference Commentary generate a wake-up call to both
judges and lawyers to more carefully consider these issues. The primary
obligation for doing so rests with the lawyers, as they must be the ones
to identify reliability/trustworthiness problems with digital business
records, develop the facts to challenge them, and argue to the courts why
the exception is inapplicable and why the proffered evidence should be
excluded. As part of this process they must be able to distinguish those
cases which have, as noted by George Paul and the Sedona Conference
Commentary, unjustifiably assumed that the digital records were reliable
and admitted them without skeptical analysis. Thereafter, it is the
responsibility of the courts to carefully consider whether the challenges
have merit, and address this on a case-specific basis, as opposed to
adopting a categorical approach that assumes reliability simply because
the evidence was computer-generated. The importance of making an
objection in the first instance, however, cannot be underscored enough,
as the Lorraine case noted:
What, then, is the effect of hearsay evidence that is admitted without
objection by the party against whom it is offered? The general rule is
that despite Rule 802, if hearsay is admitted without objection it may
be afforded its “natural probative effect, as if it were in law
admissible.”263

2. Public Records Exception under Rule 803(8)
Another hearsay exception that the Lorraine opinion recognized as
likely to be applied with regard to ESI/digital evidence is Rule 803(8),
the public records exception.264 This is an important exception because
of the ease with which it may be employed and the minimal foundation
needed to establish it.265 As noted in, Williams, the rationale for the
public records exception is as follows:
Justification for this exception derives from the trustworthiness of the
documents themselves, having been made by a public office or agency,
as well as the inherent necessity to avoid requiring public officials to
needlessly testify as witnesses about reports, data compilations,

263. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 575 (D. Md. 2007).
264. Id. at 574.
265. See supra Part III.
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records or statements made in their official capacities. The documents
are considered trustworthy due to the “duty that comes with public
service,” and it is presumed that public officials execute their tasks
“carefully and fairly, without bias or corruption, and this notion finds
support in the scrutiny and risk of exposure that surround most
government functions.” Absent the exception found at Rule 803(8),
lawyers seeking to prove facts contained within official records would
be forced to call public officials as witnesses to provide testimony
regarding the contents of the official records. This would, of course,
be burdensome and divert the efforts of officials called as witnesses
from performing their public duties.266

In Williams, the public records that were determined to be
admissible were websites from two state agencies.267 Because nearly all
local, state, and federal agencies have their own websites these days, and
those sites frequently contain significant amounts of factual information
that may be relevant to the resolution of litigation involving those
agencies, or private parties, it may be expected that Rule 803(8) will
prove particularly useful as a hearsay exception to permit the admission
into evidence of matters contained within those websites. Indeed, the
hypothetical that started this Article illustrates this, and the postings on
the FTC website regarding unfair business practices of ConsumerPro are
likely to be relevant to consumer actions against that company and the
contract claim filed against it by Tele-Sales. Other types of ESI/digital
evidence that the Lorraine opinion noted had been admitted into
evidence under the public records exception include e-mail from public
agencies268 and computerized records of a public agency.269
B. Rule 804 Hearsay Exceptions
The Lorraine opinion did not discuss the potential applicability of
the hearsay exceptions found at Rule 804 to ESI/digital evidence. These
exceptions are far fewer in number than those found in Rule 803270 and

266. Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679, 690-91 (D. Md. 2008) (quoting MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 157, § 8:86, at 770-72) (citations omitted).
267. Id. at 682.
268. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 575 (citing Lester v. Natsios, 290 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2003)).
269. Id. (citing United States v. Oceguerra-Aguirre, 70 F. App’x 473 (9th Cir. 2003)).
270. There are only five exceptions found in Rule 804. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (former
testimony of an unavailable declarant); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (dying declarations); FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(3) (statements against penal, pecuniary, or proprietary interest); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4)
(statements of an unavailable declarant regarding his or her personal or family history); FED. R.
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require an extra foundational step beyond those found in Rule 803. All
of the Rule 804 hearsay exceptions require that the proponent
demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, and Rule
804(a) identifies five circumstances in which this can occur.271 While
research has failed to disclose examples of when courts have admitted
ESI/digital evidence under the Rule 804 exceptions, it is not difficult to
imagine circumstances in which they might be willing to do so. First, as
most trials and depositions are recorded electronically, or on video,
introduction of prior trial or deposition testimony of an unavailable
declarant under Rule 804(b)(1) inevitably involves ESI/digital evidence.
Similarly, given the ubiquity of cell phones and personal digital
assistants, it is not difficult to imagine that a person who has been the
subject of a fatal or near fatal assault would make a cell phone call that
would meet the requirements of a dying declaration under Rule
804(b)(2). Further, the underlying facts in Crawford v. Washington,272
the recent landmark confrontation clause case, involved a recorded
statement of the defendant’s wife, who later asserted the marital
privilege and was unavailable for trial,273 and in the state court
prosecution the state introduced the recorded statement into evidence
under the state equivalent of Rule 804(b)(3), a statement against penal
interest.274 And, finally, it would not be hard to imagine a situation in
which a defendant in a criminal case sends a text message to a potential
witness against him threatening the witness if she testifies, and the
witness, in turn, sends a text message, or e-mail, or leaves a voicemail
message to another person which details the threat, as well as the
criminal activity of the defendant which led to it. In such a situation, the
digital communication sent by the witness likely would be admissible
under Rule 804(b)(6), if the witness was unavailable to testify at trial
because of the defendant’s threat.

EVID. 804(b)(6) (statements of an unavailable declarant that are admitted against a party whose
wrongful conduct caused the declarant to be unavailable).
271. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1) (declarant asserts a privilege and therefore cannot be
compelled to testify); FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2) (declarant refuses to testify, despite being ordered to
do so by the court); FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3) (declarant lacks sufficient memory to be able to testify
fully and completely); FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4) (declarant cannot testify because of death, illness, or
incapacity); FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5) (beyond the ability of the court to compel the declarant to
appear and testify).
272. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
273. Id. at 40.
274. Id.
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V. THE ORIGINAL WRITING RULE AS APPLIED TO ESI/DIGITAL
EVIDENCE
The Lorraine opinion also provides an analytical framework for
how the collection of evidence rules commonly known as the “best
evidence” or “original writing rules” operate in the realm of electronic or
digital evidence.275 The opinion notes that the structure of the original
writing rules is important to understand to ensure their proper
application. Rule 1001 contains a series of definitions: “original,”
“duplicate,” “writing,” “recording,” and “photograph,” and as they apply
to ESI/digital evidence, the most important definition is found at Rule
1001(3), which states, “[i]f data are stored in a computer or similar
device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect
the data accurately, is an ‘original.’”276 Thus, “the ‘original’ of
information stored in a computer is the readable display of the
information on the computer screen, the hard drive or other source where
it is stored, as well as any printout or output that may be read so long as
it accurately reflects the data.”277 Further, as a result of Rule 1003,
which provides that duplicates are co-extensively admissible as
originals, unless unauthentic or prepared under circumstances that would
make it unfair to admit them, “the distinction between duplicates and
originals largely has become unimportant.”278
Lorraine discusses when the original writing rule applies in the first
instance–the rule is inapplicable unless a party is seeking to prove the
“contents” of a writing, recording, or photograph.279 If a digital
document describes an event the occurrence of which may be proved by
the testimony of witnesses who observed it, the original writing rule is
inapplicable, and would not require introduction of the document in lieu
of the testimony of the witnesses.280 In contrast, if there is no nondocumentary proof of the occurrence, and the only evidence of what
transpired is contained in a writing, then the original writing rule
applies.281 Similarly, as in the hypothetical that began this Article, if the

275. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 567-83.
276. FED. R. EVID. 1001(3).
277. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 577-78 (citing WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 78, §
900.07[1][d][iv]; PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 194 (ABA Publishing
2005); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).
278. Id. at 578.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss2/2

56

Grimm et al.: Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co.

7-GRIMM_PUB_EDITS.DOC

2009]

4/14/2009 1:19 PM

BACK TO THE FUTURE: LORRAINE V. MARKEL AMERICAN INSURANCE CO.

413

contents of a website at a particular date are important to establish the
false or inaccurate information that the consumers saw when they
accessed the ConsumerPro website, then the original writing rule would
apply, because the plaintiffs would be seeking to prove the “content” of
the website at that particular time.
Lorraine notes that when the rule applies, it creates a hierarchy of
evidence that may be used to prove the contents of a writing, recording,
or photograph: an original or duplicate, and if not available, then by
“secondary evidence,” which is defined as “any proof of the contents of
a writing, recording or photograph other than an original or duplicate . . .
[including] testimony from the author of the writing, or someone who
read it, earlier drafts, copies, or an outline used to prepare the final
[draft].”282 Given the ephemeral nature of ESI, and the fact that it may
be deleted, overwritten, or otherwise inaccessible, secondary evidence
often must be used to prove the content of ESI/digital evidence. As the
Lorraine opinion notes:
Given the myriad ways that electronic records may be deleted, lost as a
result of system malfunctions, purged as a result of routine electronic
records management software (such as the automatic deletion of e-mail
after a set time period) or otherwise unavailable means that the
contents of electronic writings may have to be proved by secondary
evidence.283

The Lorraine opinion explains that when secondary evidence must
be used to prove the contents of ESI/digital evidence, then there are a
series of rules that govern.284 The primary rule is Rule 1004, which
permits secondary evidence to prove the contents of ESI in four
circumstances: (a) when the originals or duplicates have been lost or
destroyed, absent any bad faith by their proponent; (b) if the originals or
duplicates are not obtainable by judicial process or procedure; (c) if the
originals or duplicates are in the possession, custody or control of an
adverse party who is on notice by the pleadings or otherwise that their
contents would be the subject of proof at a trial or hearing and who does
not bring them; or (d) the documents are “collateral” to the litigation,
meaning that they do not closely relate to a controlling issue in the
litigation.285 Other rules that permit secondary evidence to prove the

282. Id. at 576.
283. Id. at 580.
284. Id. at 576 (citing FED. R. EVID. 1004-07).
285. FED. R. EVID. 1004; see also Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 579-80.
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contents of documents include Rule 1006, which permits the
introduction of summaries of voluminous writings, recordings, or
photographs, and Rule 1007, which allows the proof of the contents of a
writing, recording, or photograph through the testimonial admission of
an adverse party.286 Rule 1006 is especially important with respect to
ESI/digital evidence, and the Lorraine opinion points out that “[b]ecause
the production of electronically stored information in civil cases
frequently is voluminous, the use of summaries under Rule 1006 is a
particularly useful evidentiary tool, and courts can be expected to allow
the use of summaries provided the procedural requirements of the rule
are met.”287
Finally, the Lorraine opinion discusses an important, but frequently
overlooked rule, Rule 1008, which is a particular application of the
conditional relevance rule.288 The opinion notes that Rule 1008 “is a
specialized application of Rule 104(b), and it allocates the responsibility
between the trial judge and the jury with respect to certain preliminary
matters affecting the original writing rule.”289 As the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 1008 states,
Most preliminary questions of fact in connection with applying the rule
preferring the original as evidence of contents are for the judge, under .
. . Rule 104(a). Thus, the question whether the loss of the originals has
been established, or of the fulfillment of other conditions specified in
Rule 1004 . . . is for the judge.290

However, the Advisory Committee Notes also state:
Rule 1008 identifies three issues that are questions for the jury . . . (1)
whether the writing, recording or photograph ever existed in the first
place; (2) whether some other writing, recording, or photograph that is
offered into evidence is in fact the original; and (3) whether ‘other’

286. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. 580-82.
287. Id. at 581 (citing Wapnick v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2002-45 (T.C.
2002) (holding that summaries of voluminous computer records were admissible under Rule 1006
even though they were prepared in anticipation of litigation, because the underlying documents had
been admitted into evidence and reasonably had been made available to the opposing party to
inspect).
288. See supra Part II (discussing the conditional relevance rule).
289. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 582.
290. Id. at 582-83 (citing FED. R. EVID. 1008 advisory committee’s notes to the 1972 Proposed
Rules).
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(i.e. secondary) evidence of contents correctly reflects the content of
the writing, recording or photograph.291

In practice, these conditions frequently occur, such as when parties
negotiate a contract and exchange successive revisions of it by e-mail.
The plaintiff may contend that there was a written contract, and produce
what she claims it is, while the defendant may deny that there ever was a
meeting of the minds. Alternatively, they may agree that there was a
contract, but offer different versions of it. Further, where secondary
evidence is admissible, there may be conflicting versions of the content
of a relevant document. When this occurs, then Rule 1008 requires the
trial judge to submit to the jury the competing factual contentions, and it
is up to the jury to decide which to accept, and which to reject. What
counsel sometimes overlook is that if the dispute of fact concerns a
document that is essential to the resolution of a claim or defense, then
summary judgment will not be possible to resolve the dispute, as there is
a genuine dispute of material fact that must be submitted to the jury.
The hypothetical starting this Article shows how easily this can occur
when ESI/digital evidence is involved. If witnesses from ConsumerPro
and Tele-Sales disagree on which version of the ConsumerPro script
appeared on the website when the Tele-Sales operators secured a
particular consumer contract, then the jury will have to resolve which
version is the operative one, and neither side will be able to avoid trial
through summary judgment practice.
In its discussion of the original writing rule, the Lorraine opinion
focused on the structure of the rule and how it has been applied thus far
by courts to ESI/digital evidence. However, the court cases that have
done so to date have not wrestled with some fundamental issues about
just what constitutes the original of a computer generated or stored
document. As noted above, the definition of an “original” found in
Rule 1001 encompasses electronic documents, and the definition is
extremely broad: “If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any
printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data
accurately, is an ‘original.’”292 This definition does not give much
guidance about what to do with the components of an electronically
generated document that are not visible when the document is “opened”
on the computer and the screen-readable version is visible. Those
familiar with electronic documents know that all documents contain
291. Id. at 583.
292. FED. R. EVID. 1001(3).
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“metadata,” which, as Lorraine notes, has been usefully defined as
follows:
Metadata, “commonly described as ‘data about data,’ is defined as
‘information describing the history, tracking, or management of an
electronic document.’ . . . [Metadata includes] ‘all of the contextual,
processing, and use information needed to identify and certify the
scope, authenticity, and integrity of active or archival electronic
information or records.’”293

To date, courts have not had to resolve the relationship that
metadata has to the screen-readable version of a document in the context
of the original writing rule. Expressed differently, is the metadata part
of the “original” of the document under Rule 1001(3), or only the
portion that is “readable by sight” when the document first is opened?
In a more robust fashion, George Paul describes this difference
between a “digital” document and a “paper” document, the latter of
which is three-dimensional. He observes:
Writings in the digital realm are different. . . . Such records are very
close to “pure information,” and exist by virtue of a mere succession of
the differentiation of 1s and 0s, distinguished by electricity flowing in
machine systems. In writing today we deal in pure information
objects, unfettered by matter. They can be whisked or shaken or
rearranged in an instant. Such records are actually layers of
abstraction, one view stacked on top of another. At the deepest layer is
the world of bits, 1s and 0s. As one builds on top of this, the bits of
information can carry letters and numbers. This collection of letters
and numbers may be partitioned into smaller collections to represent,
for example, such categories as “name” and “date of birth.” Then there
are layers designed to be presentations of information to viewers of
that data. Conjoined with this data is a collection of information about
the other data, which collection is often called “metadata.” This
metadata is information that software developers have designed to be
recorded in a record and that is inserted there by the system itself. For
example, even without making any entry or modifying any data, each
time one saves a document one is editing on a word-processing
program that program, and the system that supports that program, will
record the date and time of that “save” event in the data being “saved.”
This information then becomes a part of the record . . . .

293. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 547 (quoting Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D.
640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005)).
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There is also usually a top-layered presentation view that is normally
viewed by the operator of the program in question. For example, in a
word-processing application, such as Microsoft Word, one can view a
page as it is being typed. This view contains what the layperson
normally considers the data of a file. Interestingly, although the view
often looks very much like a page of paper, this is of course an illusion,
something the application has designed to mimic old-style physical
records. What we are viewing is simply the top-level view: the view of
what the record normally shows to people who view it on a screen and
also upon printing out the record onto paper.294

To date, the courts that have considered the original writing rule as
it applies to the admissibility of ESI/digital evidence have tended to
view the “original” as the “top-level view” of “what the record normally
shows to people who view it on a screen and also upon printing out the
record onto paper.”295 Disputes about metadata have tended to focus on
its discoverability,296 or its utility in authenticating a digital document.297
Whether they will continue to do so, or begin to expand their view of
whether the original is to include the “hidden” or unseen digital
components of a computer-generated or stored document remains to be
seen. However, it may be predicted that for the foreseeable future they
will continue to treat the “original” as the portion that is viewed when
the digital document is opened or printed from a computer because that
is the portion that is “readable by sight” as stated in Rule 1001(3), and
because that is the component of the digital document that tends to be
the version that is used or disseminated by its author, and hence most
likely to be the legally operative version that figures into a future legal
dispute.

294. PAUL, supra note 5, at 19-20 (emphasis added).
295. Id. at 20. See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Reyes, No. 03 C 8056, 2006 WL 533364, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2006) (holding that a computer printout of information that has been stored on the
computer is an “original” under Rule 1001(3)); Con-Way Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Auto Sports
Unlimited, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-570, 2007 WL 2875207, at *3-4 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2007) (noting
that reprinted invoices based on information extracted from computer which generated the invoices
originally sent to defendant constitute “originals” under Rule 1001(3)).
296. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (allowing a party to identify the form or forms of production
in which an electronic document is to be produced, which can include its “native” form, containing
metadata); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 576-83; Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 646-55 (discussing the
discoverability of metadata).
297. Lorraine, 242 F.R.D. at 547 (discussing how metadata may be used to authenticate ESI).
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VI. PREJUDICIAL IMPACT
The final “evidentiary hurdle” to admissibility of ESI or digital
evidence discussed in Lorraine is whether the evidence, if otherwise
admissible under all of the previously discussed evidentiary rules, is
excessively prejudicial when compared with its probative value. At the
outset, it should be emphasized that the balancing that Rule 403
contemplates favors admissibility over exclusion. Under the rule,
relevant and otherwise admissible evidence, including ESI, is only
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.298 Thus, the prejudice must be disproportionately
greater than its probative value. And because all evidence offered by
one party is prejudicial to the extent that it proves the proffering party’s
case against the party to which the evidence is offered, the prejudice
needed to justify exclusion under Rule 403 must be “unfair.”
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, reflecting back on the Lorraine opinion two years
after it was issued, Lorraine continues to be the only case to attempt a
comprehensive analysis of evidentiary issues associated with admitting
ESI. The opinion seems to have succeeded in its stated objective—to
provide a useful and exhaustive guide to courts and lawyers regarding
the rules and principles that must be applied to ensure admissibility of
ESI or digital evidence, which increasingly accounts for all nontestimonial evidence offered as evidence at trial or in summary
judgment. Further, following Lorraine, courts, both those which cite
Lorraine and those which do not, have mainly adhered to the standards
and principles that Lorraine advanced. As such, it continues to remain a
useful resource, especially as a starting point in approaching this
challenging area of evidence law. This Article has brought Lorraine
forward, by discussing subsequent developments in digital evidence law,
making observations about trends that can be expected to continue, and
forecasting issues that await future development. Therefore, it was a
worthwhile exercise to take a moment, and go back to the future.

298. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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